The 1966 Maryland gubernatorial election : the political saliency of open occupancy. by Hatfield, Michael S.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014
1975
The 1966 Maryland gubernatorial election : the
political saliency of open occupancy.
Michael S. Hatfield
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses
This thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses 1911 -
February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Hatfield, Michael S., "The 1966 Maryland gubernatorial election : the political saliency of open occupancy." (1975). Masters Theses
1911 - February 2014. 2506.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses/2506

THE 1966 MARYLAND GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION
THE POLITICAL SALIENCY OF OPEN OCCUPANCY
A Thesis Presented
by
Michael S . Hatfield
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
August 1975
Major Subject Political Science
THE 1966 MARYLAND GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION
THE POLITICAL SALIENCY OF OPEN OCCUPANCY
A Thesis Presented
by
Michael S . Hatfield
Approved as to style and content by:
Glen Gordon. Member of Committee
TO JANE
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2016
https://archive.org/details/1966marylandgube00hatf
INTRODUCTION
It is hypothesized that the salient open occupancy issue accounted
for much of the variance in electoral preference in the 1966 Maryland Guber-
natorial Election. We propose to validate this assertion by (1) establishing
the existence of definite attitudes on integrated housing and political
representation of such attitudes (2) verbal and quantitative analysis of
candidates' campaigns and voter support in the primary and general elec-
tion, and (3) analysis of the place occupied by the open occupancy issue in
the campaign and the degree to which it determined electoral preference in
this election. An aggregate evaluation of the election data by counties and
economic areas, we feel, will permit a valid conclusion that this civil rights
issue significantly affected voter preference.
One final note. Given the significance of the term "salient" in this
presentation, we feel obliged to briefly inform the reader as to the context
in which the term is utilized. In referring to an issue as salient, we imply
that a particular concern is most prominent and relevant among groups of
voters, relative to other topics. Brodbeck and Burdick, in American Voting
Behavior
,
suggest that voters devote more "attention," "time," and "interest
to such issues. "Salient issues are connected with the success, survival,
purpose, or major goals of the group, and therefore the most political weight
is attached to them. " A So that we refer to this brief description by the
above source in categorizing the term "salient" throughout this thesis.
•^Burdick & Brodbeck (ed.) American Voting Behavior, pgs. 170-171
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CHAPTER I
ATTITUDES ON INTEGRATED HOUSING
The purpose of Chapter One is to establish the potential salient and
controversial nature of open occupancy. Analysis of this topic requires
investigation as to whether (1) definite attitudes on integrated housing
exist and (2) whether politicans correctly perceive such attitudes.
Samples of both suburban and non-suburban attitudes are considered.
Where the initial investigation is concerned, it may be of assistance to
briefly determine what suburbanites like about the suburbs, and by implica-
tion, why certain attitudes on open occupancy exist. Nina and Claude Gruen
state that "the suburban resident has chosen his present location because it
offers him the highest housing value for which he feels he wants to pay. .
.
this housing value includes (not only) physical shelter, space, and comfort,
but a host of social, environmental, and public services that are attached to
the suburban location he has chosen to live in."* This observation was
supported by a Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission study, where
suburban residents were asked to specify major factors influencing selec-
tion of their home. Thirty-four percent cited proximity to work, friends,
school, or other institution; 32% mentioned factors associated with the social
makeup of the neighborhood. Familiarity with the neighborhood, the
1
2prestige 01 exclusiveness of the area, and the type of people living at the
location were the most frequently specified social factors.
In depth investigation of what suburbanites like about the suburbs
would require a complex socio-economic analysis. At best, what we have
presented is a surface evaluation of the subject. Yet an in-depth discussion
of this particular topic is not our specific concern, but is only intended to
serve as an introduction to definite suburban attitudes existent on open
occupancy
.
The Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission in 1970 investigated
attitudes toward racial integration in the Dayton, Ohio Metropolitan Area0
(i.e.
,
Dayton and its immediate suburbs)
. Respondent categories to the
Commission's questionnaire on the desirability of integration were sub-
grouped into low income white families without a husband, low income
white families with a husband, low income black families without a husband,
low income black families with a husband, moderate income white families
without a husband, moderate income white families with a husband, moderate
income black families without a husband, and moderate income black families
with a husband. (The sub-categories of "husband" and "no husband"
have particular sociological implications as seen by the Commission, and are
not especially relevant to our study of attitudes on open occupancy as a
political issue
. )
3Where attitudes toward racial integration were concerned, both low
and moderate income whites preferred segregation between the races, as
reported by the findings of the Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission;
(figures recorded are 64% and 67% respectively)
. Low and moderate income
whites (where no husband was present)
,
preferred segregation by only 33%.
NOTE: The Commission reported that an integrated neighborhood was
perceived, by husband-less white families, as more tolerant of such a house-
hold; hence, only a 33% rate of preferred segregation. Most significant,
the mean average of whites that preferred segregation (i.e.
,
low and
moderate white families, with and without husbands)
,
is 49.2%. Where low
and moderate income blacks (with husband in the family) are concerned,
32% and 12% respectively
,
advocated segregation. Low income blacks, where
no husband was present, advocated segregation in residential areas by 33%;
moderate income blacks (where no husband was present)
,
advocated integra-
tion by 100%. The mean average of blacks that prefer segregation and
integration is 19.2% and 80 .7% respectively . Very importantly, this analysis
indicates the disparity between blacks and whites on attitudes toward the
desirability of integration in housing (where whites favor integration by
slightly over 50% and blacks by almost 81%. Segregation is favored by
whites at a rate of 49.2%, and by blacks, 19.2%.
A second study conducted by the Miami Valley Regional Planning
4Commission (MVRPC) investigated attitudes of suburbanites from four,
varied SES-demographic backgrounds. "Suburban Area One " 4 is a small
city surrounded by farmland, outside the main metropolitan county. It has
the lowest median family income of all four areas, and the lowest median
house value. "Suburban Area Two" is geographically far from the city.
It is a fairly prosperous and rapidly growing community, virtually all
white, and desirous of maintaining a suburban, low density, residential
0
environment. The population consists primarily of middle and working
class households. "Suburban Area Three" is the richest of the four suburbs.
It is an all white area, with the highest family income and house value.
"Suburban Area Four" is a black suburban area attracted by well-to-do
black families who can afford to move from the center of the city. So that
the sample of suburban attitudes reflects this cross-section of varied back-
grounds .
Yet the statistical findings compiled by the MVRPC do not reflect
significant differences in attitudes
,
relative to the four sampled suburbs
.
Principal authors Nina and Claude Gruen, in analyzing the Commission's
findings, state that "similarity of responses between the four areas was
startling. . .averages (on attitudes toward integration) did not differ signifi-
cantly
.
"
^
5Investigation cf suburban reactions to the migration of low and moder-
ate income groups reveals (what can well be interpreted as)
,
a strong
"racial bias" among suburban dwellers. Categories of potential migrants
were divided into the following:
a) low income elderly white
b) low income elderly black
c) low income physically handicapped white
d) low income physically handicapped black
e) low income white family with husband
f) low income black family with husband
g) low income white family without husband
h) low income black family without husband
i) moderate income white family with husband
j) moderate income white family without husband
k) moderate income black family with husband
l) moderate income black family without husband
If racial bias were not a significant factor in the determination of
suburbanite acceptance or rejection of migration into their neighborhoods,
we would expect relatively similar types of reaction to the prospects of both
low income black families with husband and low income white families with
husband, as well as moderate income black families without husband and
moderate income white families without husband, and low income white
elderly acceptance or rejection to be similar to that of low income black
elderly, etc. Yet where a hypothetical migration level was set at 5% (i.e.
,
where the suburban resident was asked his reaction to 5% of the area being
comprised of a particular group) , five of six black groups were rejected
while one of six white groups was rejected. Authors Nina and Claude Gruen
6report that, "
. . .suburbanites show a strong racial bias: In almost every
instance, the black household with husband (for example) was less accept-
able than the white household without .
"
b
[Average score definitions
(reflecting responses of resident suburbanites) were formulated by the Com-
mission where 1.00 to 2.49 indicated an acceptance of a given group; 2.50 to
3.50, a tolerant acceptance; 3.51 to 5.00, a rejection of particular group
migration into the suburbs at the 5% level. ]
No group received a score indicative of outright acceptance. However,
the moderate income white family, with husband, received the highest
neutral score (tolerant acceptance)
,
of 3.07, and therefore was the most
accepted group. Second, was the moderate income white family without hus-
band (a neutral score of 3. IS); third, the low income white elderly (a
neutral score of 3.23); fourth, the moderate income black family with hus-
band (the only black group receiving a neutral score— 3 .31) ; fifth, low
income white physically handicapped (a neutral score of 3.33); sixth, the
low income white family with husband (a neutral score of 3.46); seventh,
the moderate income black family without husband (a negative score-rejec-
tion-of 3.53); eighth, the low income black elderly (a negative score of
3.55); ninth, the low income physically handicapped black (a negative score
of 3.57); tenth, the low income white family without husband (3.64);
eleventh, the low income black family with husband (a rejection rate of
73.67); and lastly, the low income black family without husband (a rejection
rate of 3.91) . So that a rank order of groups accepted (receiving neutral
scores) and groups rejected (receiving negative scores)
,
appears as follows:
RANK ORDER GROUPS ACCEPTED
1 moderate income whites
(families with husbands)
2 moderate income whites
(families without husbands)
3 low income white elderly
4 moderate income blacks
(families with husbands)
5 low income whites
(physically handicapped)
6 low income whites
(families with husbands)
RANK ORDER GROUPS RETECTED
12 low income blacks
(families without husbands)
11 low income blacks
(families with husbands)
10 low income whites
(families without husbands)
9 low income blacks
(physically handicapped
8 low income black elderly
7 moderate income blacks
(families without husbands)
The aforementioned racial bias of suburban attitudes seems apparent
in realizing that (a) while moderate income white families without husbands
are accepted, their black counterparts, i.e.
,
moderate income black families
without husbands, are not; (b) while low income elderly whites are accepted,
their black counterparts are not; (c) while low income physically handi-
capped whites are accepted, low income physically handicapped blacks are
not; (d) while low income white families with husbands are accepted, low
income blacks in this category are not accepted.
In order to further establish the validity of our assertion that racial
bias appears to be evident among the responses given by suburbanites,
where integrated housing is concerned . a study of group rejection rates,
8holding "low income" (income less than $5000) constant is proposed,
followed by the utilization of the identical technique where moderate income
groups are concerned. It is discovered, via the survey on attitudes of the
suburbanite, that 55% of these respondents listed low income blacks as
"among the least preferred" group where suburban migration was concerned;
(note that this group consists of low income black families, with and without
husbands, low income black elderly, and low income black physically handi-
capped)
. Thirty-one percent of these respondents listed low income whites
as among the least preferred group where suburban migration was con-
cerned
. Nineteen percent of suburban residents named moderate income
blacks as among the least preferred groups while 5% listed moderate income
whites in this category. NOTE: Moderate income is $5000 to $10000. 7 Nina
and Claude Gruen make several comments which relate directly to our find-
ings. "The survey brought into the open the. . .conflict between the middle
class ideal that everyone is equally acceptable and the attitude that those
g
who differ may be harmful to the middle class neighborhood." Mention of
several respondents' comments on integrated housing lend support to the
Gruen observation. Stated one suburban resident: "I don't want people who
9
give all night parties or receive welfare checks living next door to me."
A housewife in suburbia commented: "It would be beneficial for my daughter
to live with all kinds of people as long as they had the same ideals and were
91
0
neat and clean." We suggest, very simply for the moment, that these
types of suburban attitudes (indicated via the inflated rejection rates of
lower and moderate income blacks
,
relative to whites in the identical cate-
gory) have implications for the issue of open occupancy politically.
As a consequence of evaluating particular suburban attitudes on
integrated housing, it appears essential to briefly suggest possible "reasons"
for such attitudes. An educated assumption would be that reasons for these
specific feelings are closely related to those factors (previously mentioned)
that attract one to the suburbs; i.e.
,
the presence of integrated housing
may be perceived as a threat to the "prestige or exclusiveness of the neigh-
borhood," and "housing value, in both the physical sense and in terms of
social, environmental, and public services".^ Indeed., a study cf suburban
respondents' reasons for considering low and moderate income households
undesirable neighbors (and by implication, lower income blacks in particu-
lar given our previous analysis) appears to reflect a perceived need to
protect stated attractions of suburbia. The Miami Valley Regional Planning
1 0
Commission reports the below findings: 1 55% perceived a drop in property
values; 59% of suburban residents feared that migration by certain groups
would result in a decrease in housing maintenance and general housing
conditions; 43% envisioned a decrease in law and order; 40% indicated that
the neighborhood would become less stable (i.e.
,
a decrease in social
status and neighborhood organization); 38% perceived a drop in quality of
10
schools and 36% envisioned an increase in property taxes due to the need for
increased sei vices. So that a rank order of "reasons 11 for considering low
and moderate income groups undesirable neighbors, particularly the black
lower income groups (as perceived by suburbanites) are:
1) decrease in housing maintenance
2) drop in property values
3) decrease in law and order
4) decrease in stability of neighborhood
5) drop in quality of schools
6) increase in property taxes due to need for increase in services
Heretofore, we have limited discussion of attitudes on integrated
housing to the suburbs, primarily. A national study (of both suburbs and
non-suburban areas) conducted by the Division of Behavioral Sciences of
the National Research Council supports the findings of the Miami Valley
Regional Planning Commission. Five basic questions relating to attitudes
on integrated housing were asked nationally of a white sample.
1) . . .tell me if you personally would or would not object to: having a black
family as your next door neighbor
The question was submitted in August of 1966; 51% of the white sample
indicated they would object to the entry of blacks into their neighborhood
.
NOTE: 49 . 2% objected to integration (among whites) in the Dayton survey.
2) Would you move if black people came to live in great numbers in your
neighborhood?
The question was submitted in July of 1966; 70% of the white sample
indicated they would move in such a case.
11
3) White people have a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods if
they want, and blacks should respect that right.
The question was submitted in April of 1968; 54% of the white sample
agreed with the above statement.
4) Would you favor a Federal law forbidding discrimination in housing
against blacks?
The question was submitted in October of 1966; 51% of the white sample
indicated they would oppose such a law.
5) In your own words, what is "open occupancy" -what does this term mean?
NOTE; If the respondent's definition of open housing was fairly accurate
(as judged by the surveyors)
,
the additional question was asked: Would
you like to see Congress pass or reject an open housing bill?
The question was submitted in April of 1967; 39% had a correct concep-
tion of open housing. Fifty-four percent of this group indicated that Con-
gress should reject such a bill.
The above attitudes appear to reflect degrees of racial bias vis-a-vis
the issue of housing (as noted by Nina and Claude Gruen) . - ^ The study of
the National Research Council indicates (a) a significant desire for segre-
gated housing among whites (b) majority opposition, among whites, to open
housing legislation.
Given the above conclusion
,
it is important to contrast white attitudes
on integrated housing with black attitudes on the subject. While an exclu-
sive evaluation of black opinion is not possible on the suburban level,
given our sources, such an analysis on a national level (i.e , a
12
consideration of both suburban and non-suburban areas) is possible via
the National Research Council study. 15 Questions asked of the black sample
were:
1) Would you personally prefer to live in a neighborhood with all blacks,
mostly blacks, mostly whites, or a neighborhood that is mixed half and half?
The question submitted in the winter of 1968, 48% (five times greater
than any other response except for "no difference") indicated a preference
for "mixed half and half." NOTE: This opinion may be contrasted with
questions one and two previously asked of the white sample. A half
black, half white ratio, as suggested by blacks in answering the above ques-
tion, could possibly be interpreted as the presence of blacks in "great
numbers" as noted in question two where 70% of the white respondents
indicated they would relocate in such a situation . The point is that conflict-
ing opinions over the desirability of integrated housing apparently exist
between the races
.
2) An owner of property should not have to sell to blacks if he doesn't want
to. (sample taken from blacks residing in Detroit)
The question was submitted in September, 1968; 54% of the black
sample disagreed with this statement. (This opinion may be contrast-
ed with question three submitted to white respondents, where 54% indicated
that whites have a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods and that
13
blacks should respect that right.) Again, our purpose for comparison of
attitudes is to stress the differing opinions of blacks and whites over the
issue of housing
.
3) Which do you think is more important now: to get more and better
housing, in and around where blacks live already, or to open housing for
blacks in other parts of the city and suburbs?
The question was submitted in September of 1968; 44% of the black
sample indicated a preference for more and better housing yet a significant
41% stated that interracial housing was more important; 14% said both were
"equally vital." NOTE: Clearly a majority of blacks favor, at least, open
housing (41% plus 14%) . This contrasts with the opinion of white respondents
who oppose open housing legislation and presumably, open housing (given
white attitudes on segregation) . No direct question concerning federal
legislation to assure integrated housing was asked of blacks in the National
Research Council study. We make a major assumption here that since blacks
favor open occupancy, they favor for the most part, legislation to enforce
its prospects
.
A major conclusion, then, is that definite racially related attitudes on
integrated housing do exist. A study by the Miami Valley Regional Planning
Commission indicates significant preference for segregated housing among
whites in the Dayton, Ohio Metropolitan A.rea. Via a second MVRPC survey,
white suburban attitudes appear to be characterized by racial bias. Five
14
of six black groups studied were perceived as "undesirable neighbors"
while five of six white groups were perceived as at least tolerable. On the
national level, white attitudes were distinguished, also, by significant
preference for segregated housing.
A survey of black opinion by the National Research Council indicated
that a majority of this group favored open housing (but also favored pro-
grams designed to increase the quality and quantity of housing in black
neighborhoods)
. So that definite, conflicting opinions on the desirability of
integrated housing exist between blacks and whites.
Next, we want to investigate the attitudes and perceptions of politi-
cians. The assertion is that these public officials correctly perceive the
attitudes of their constituents and therefore are representative of such
attitudes. If this assumption proves valid, conflicting views on integrated
housing have the potential of being politically relevant (for the moment,
such ambiguity will suffice)
. (The investigation of politicians' atti-
tudes and perceptions relative to those of their constituents, and the ulti-
mate representative nature of the former's behavior, is based upon the
MVRPC suburban analysis
. ) We make a major, educated assumption that
politicians' attitudes and perceptions vis-a-vis non-suburban whites and
black constituents are likewise respectively representative.
15
The basis for the stated "educated assumption" is a study conducted
by Miller and Stokes entitled Constituency Influence in Concrress
.
^ The
authors suggest that congressional representation of constituency is a mix-
ture between the Burkean model (which places the congressman in the role
of representing CONSTITUENT INTERESTS)
,
the instructed-delegate model
(where the congressman responds directly to the WILL OF THE CONSTITU-
ENT)
,
and the responsible party model (where a NATIONAL CONSTITUENCY
overshadows the local electorate)
. Theoretically, the greatest degree of
constituent "control" over the congressman is with the second of the three
stated models
.
Given the Miller and Stokes study of three major issue areas,
i.e., foreign affairs, social welfare, and civil rights, the latter issue
category was found to be representative of the instructed-delegate model
(the other two issue areas were found indicative of the other stated models) .
Specifically, the representative's roll call behavior was most con-
sistent with the constituency's attitudes (either due to an identical attitude
by the congressman or the representative's correct perception of the
electorate's attitude) on the issue of civil rights-as opposed to social welfare
policy or foreign affairs. In an analysis which correlated constituency
attitude with the representative's perception of that attitude, the rate of
association was .53, compared to .19 and .17 for foreign affairs and social
welfare policy respectively
.
16
So that our previously stated educated assumption that politicians, in
general, are representative of their constituents where open occupany is
the issue, is based upon the theme of the Miller and Stokes study. Yet in
conclusion, utilization of this analysis makes another assumption; that the
issue of open occupancy is a civil rights question.
In the study conducted by the MVRPC, politicians and public officials
were surveyed from three of the four previously mentioned "Suburban
Areas; " the black suburban region being excluded. Several basic findings
17emerge:
1) politicians tended to represent the attitudes of their constituents rather
than not
2) politicians' attitudes were not dependent upon their particular role in
government or their jurisdiction
3) directly related to the initial finding, the majority of the public officials,
whether elected or appointed, were knowledgeable concerning the attitudes
and preferences of their^constituents and the majority were willing to
incorporate these desires into their policy and program formulations
Analysis of public officials' projections of their constituents reactions
to low and moderate income households comprising less than 10% of their
communities indicates the following: the moderate income white family with
husband is perceived as most acceptable (67% of surveyed politicians
believed that suburbanites would accept this group); second most acceptable,
as perceived by public officials is the low income white elderly group (61%)
;
third, the low income white physically handicapped (50%); fourth, the
17
moderate income black family with husband (42%); fifth, the moderate income
white family without husband and the low income white family with husband
(39% respectively); sixth, the low income black physically handicapped
(18%); seventh, low income black family with husband (17%); eighth, the
low income black elderly (11%); ninth, the low income white family without
husband (10%); tenth, the moderate income black family without husband
(6%); eleventh, the low income black family without husband (0%) . A rank
order comparison of politicians' projections of constituents' attitudes with
actual attitudes of suburbanites is illustrated below:
PUBLIC OFFICIALS PROJECTIONS ACTUAL SUBURBAN ATTITUDES
1) moderate income white families
with husband
2) low income white elderly
3) low income white physically
handicapped
4) moderate income black families
with husband
5) moderate income white families
without husband
6) low income white families
with husband
7) low income black physically
handicapped
8) iow income black families
with husband
9 ( low income black elderly
10) low income white families
without husband
11) moderate income black
families without husband
12) low income black families
without husband
1) moderate income white families
with husband
2) moderate income white families
without husband
3) low income white elderly
4) moderate income black families
with husband
5) low income white physically
handicapped
6) low income white families
with husband
7) moderate income black families
without husband
8) low income black elderly
9) low income black physically
handicapped
10) low income white families
without husband
11) low income black families with
husband
12) low income black families
without husband
18
Of the six groups perceived as least acceptable by public officials,
in anticipation of constituents 1 reactions, five such croups consisted of
black individuals (i.e.
,
low income physically handicapped blacks, low
income black families, with and without husbands, moderate income blacks
without husbands in the family, and low income black elderly)
. Likewise,
of the six groups perceived as most acceptable by politicians, in anticipa-
tion of constituents' reactions, five of such groups consisted of white
individuals (i.e.
,
moderate income white families with husbands, low
income white elderly, low income white physically handicapped, moderate
income white families without husbands, and low income white families with
husbands) . THE IDENTICAL PATTERN PERSISTS WHERE ACTUAL SUBURB-
ANITE ATTITUDES ARE CONCERNED. There appears to be definite racial
(and also class) bias where suburban attitudes and perceptions by suburban
politicians relate to integrated housing . Both blacks and the lower income
categories are considered least desirable suburban neighbors. (By
implication, the lower income black, all other variables negated, is the most
unwelcomed into the suburban community. Further investigation illustrates
the similarity between actual attitudes of suburbanites vis-a-vis integrated
housing and the perceptions of the politician.) Concerning suburban atti-
tudes, again, the black moderate income family with husband is the sole
group receiving a neutral (interpreted as "tolerant") score; this same group
19
is perceived by suburban politicians as the most acceptable among black
groups
.
We indicated a bias against lower income groups (and blacks) in the
suburbs. Where both the actual attitudes of the suburban dweller and per-
ceptions of the politician in suburbia are studied, five of the six lowest
rated groups (those groups rejected)
,
were lower income groups. Four of
these rejected, lower income groups consisted of black individuals. Our
point is that the perceptions of politicians in relation to the acceptability of
certain groups' movement into the suburbs, accurately reflects, what can be
interpreted as, the racially and class biased attitudes of the suburban resi-
dent.
One final comparative analysis will lend support to this observation
.
The suburbanites' "reasons" for considering low income and black house-
holds as undesirable neighbors is contrasted with such factors as perceived
by the politician. Close inspection indicates that of the six most "significant"
reasons cited by suburbanites for labelling groups as undesirable, tive such
factors are perceived by the suburban politician. (Degree of signifi-
cance is determined by percent suburban respondents and percent suburban
politicians that cited particular reasons for the perception of groups as
, IP
unacceptable. ) These iactors are:
-
20
1) a drop in property values (50%)
2) race (50%)
3) decrease in quality of schools (47%)
4) increase in property taxes due to need for increased social services (28%)
5) decrease in law and order (28%)
6) decrease in housing maintenance (25%)
NOTE: See list of factors cited by the suburban resident
The sole, significant reason stated by suburbanites as a factor in
citing certain groups undesirable, which was not recognized by the politi-
cian, was "the decrease in the stability of the neighborhood." Yet a key
response from public officials (50%)
,
indicating why particular groups
might be unwelcomed in suburbia, was "race." This response is especially
significant given the fact that the answer was not directly on the Miami
Valley Regional Planning Commission questionnaire but was a "write-in; "
note that "race" was not a significant response category where suburbanites
were concerned
.
Analysis of the implications of "neighborhood stability" indicates a
close similarity with race as a factor in labelling a group as an undesirable
neighbor. The term, as authors Nina and Claude Gruen stated, implied
the migration of (as one suburban dweller noted) , "people that would be a
bad influence cn my family," and "people that would not fit in with the rest
of the community. 1 ' 19 Given the "suburban bias," previously noted, the
above statements appear to have possible racial implications . So that con-
sensus is apparent between the suburban response of 'neighborhood
21
stability" and the politicians' race response.
In conclusion, we have attempted to illustrate that suburban politi-
cians correctly perceive, and represent the attitudes of their suburban
constituents where integrated housing is concerned. When particular atti-
tudes of the suburban dweller were investigated, definite patterns of bias
against lower income and black individuals appeared to exist (again, the
implications of racial bias are more important given the emphasis of our
study on open occupancy-as opposed to class bias) . A major assumption is
made that non-suburban white and black politicians correctly perceive and
represent the attitudes of their constituents as the suburban MVRPC study
indicated of suburban politicians; to support this assumption we utilized
the Miller and Stokes analysis.
In sum, these points emerge:
1) Suburbanites have definite attitudes on integrated housing as do white,
non-suburban dwellers and blacks (the Miami Valley Regional Planning
Commission study, analyzed by Nina and Claude Gruen and the National
Research Council study indicate this) . Suburbanites (by implication,
white individuals) , and non-suburban whites are reluctant to accept blacks
into their neighborhoods
.
2) Black attitudes, as indicated in the national survey by the National
Research Council, express a desire for both an in, ci case m the c.uaj.uy o±
22
housing in black areas, and an increase in integrated housing.
3) Given our analyses and stated assumptions, politicians and public
officials accurately perceive and represent the attitudes of their respective
20
constituents
.
So that the issue of integrated housing, given the existence of definite,
conflicting attitudes by individuals, and the correct perception of those
attitudes by politicians, is potentially, "politically salient; " i.e., the
possibility exists that candidate (electoral) preference in a given election
might be based upon such an issue. In this sense, the issue of open
occupancy has political implications .
NOTE: In Chapter Five, reference is made to the criteria essential in order
for an "issue" to be capable of possibly determining electoral preference.
Our purpose here, again, is to establish the conflict in attitudes vis-a-vis
open occupancy and to infer the potential of the issue's politically salient
nature
.
CHAPTER II
DISTRICT POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC SKETCH
The purpose of Chapter Two is to acquaint the reader with the basic
economic areas of Maryland, and to provide a brief political sketch of the
state
.
In order to facilitate an analysis of the former, a technique suggested
by Bogue and Beale in Economic Areas of the United States is utilized. 1
The state's "economic areas" are comprised of: Western Maryland, Maryland
Piedmont, Southern Maryland, Maryland Eastern Shore Upper, Maryland
Eastern Shore Lower, the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area, and the
Maryland section of the Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area.
NOTE: The Bogue and Beale technique is used in Chapters Three and Four
with respect to the analysis of candidate preference.
Western Maryland, consisting of Allegany and Garrett counties ranks
sixth in area population (104,539) of the state's seven regions, with much of
its inhabitants concentrated around the third largest city, Cumberland (pop.
33,415). Manufacturing (synthetic fibres , paper products , steel, railroad
equipment)
,
farming (mostly dairying and beef cattle) , and coal mining
are leading economic activities. Because of its particular industrial
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products, the strong competition in coal mining with nearby Pennsylvania
and West Virginia, and the region's greater-than-usual involvement in rail
transportation (handling freight destined for the Baltimore Metropolitan
Area in particular)
,
this area has been typically one of the first to exper-
ience layoffs during business recessions
. Western Maryland is 63% blue
collar, 73% rural, less than 1% black, 3% foreign stock, with a median income
of $7000 and a median educational level of 10.4 years.
Maryland Piedmont, consisting of Carroll, Frederick, Harford,
Howard, and Washington counties ranks third in area population (323,808)
of the state's economic regions, with much of its inhabitants concentrated
around the cities of Hagerstown (pop. 36,660) and Frederick (pop. 21,744).
In contrast with Southern and Eastern Shore Maryland, Maryland
Piedmont is more Northern than Southern in its economic and cultural orienta-
tion, although the population is largely rural. Manufacturing is a larger
source of employment than is agriculture with many industries located in
rural districts. Significant numbers of inhabitants in Maryland Piedmont
commute to jobs in Hagerstown, Frederick, or nearby parts of the Baltimore
and Washington Metropolitan areas . Federal employment, especially in
military installations such as the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, is an important
and expanding source of work. Railroad employment is an important but
diminishing source of employment, while economic emphasis is cn daiiying
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directed toward nearby urban markets. The region is also characterized
by some commercial fruit growing in the northward extension of the
Shenandoah Valley.
Maryland Piedmont is 55% blue collar, 66% rural, 5% black, 6% foreign
stock, with a median income of $10,554 and a median educational level of
11 years
.
Southern Maryland, consisting of Calvert, Charles, and St. Mary's
counties, is economically and culturally Southern. Slavery was fully devel-
oped in this region and only within recent decades has the white population
exceeded the black. For 300 years the culture and economy of the region
have been based on tobacco. "Southern Maryland is probably the only sec-
tion in the country where the main support of the economy in colonial times
O
is still the main support today."
Until 1960, this region was totally rural. The single urban setting
had slightly over 7000 persons. The region's population has increased
over the past decade (35% increase in population)
,
since it has become a
rural residential district for some who work in the adjacent metropolitan
areas in Baltimore and Washington. The area, however, ranks last in pop-
ulation (87,313) of the state's seven economic regions. In addition, Southern
Maryland is 88% rural, 52% blue collar, 29% black, 5% foreign stock, with a
median income of $9123 and a median educational level of 11 years.
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Maryland Eastern Shore Upper, consisting of Caroline, Cecil, Kent,
Queen Annes, and Talbot counties, is also culturally Southern, having been
a slave-holding region before the Civil War. The region ranks fifth in
population (121,498)
,
and is agriculturally oriented toward staple crops
such as wheat and corn. In the last thirty years this region has shifted from
cash grain into dairying because of a change in the relative profitability of
the two types of farming
. The dairy farm is now the most numerous type of
farm. However, grain farming remains a supplementary source of income
for dairymen
.
Tenancy rates are much higher among commercial farmers in the
Upper Eastern Shore relative to other areas in the state. The practice of
renting farms is particularly common among dairy, grain, and general
farmers. NOTE: Poultry farming, typical of Maryland Lower Eastern Shore,
with its smaller average investment in land and equipment, is usually the
enterprise of a farmer who owns his land in the state. Other economic
activities in the Upper Eastern Shore include a substantial stake in Chesa-
peake Eay fisheries and limited manufacturing concentrated in the north-
easternmost extension that lies along the Baltimore-Wilmington transporta-
tion axis
.
The area is 66% blue collar, 21% black, 75% rural, 3% foreign stock:
the median income is $8078 and the median educational level, 10 years. The
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region has no places of 10, 000 inhabitants or more. NOTE: Bogue and Beale
set a figure of 10,000 as indicative of significant concentration or urban
O
population
.
Maryland Eastern Shore Lower, consisting of Dorchester, Somerset,
Wicomico, and Worcester counties (ranking fourth in population: 122,072)
,
is also culturally Southern. Not only was this region slave-holding at one
time, but recently (in the mid-sixties)
,
the city of Cambridge in Dorchester
County, was the scene of violence between civil rights activists and staunch
segregationists
.
Economically, this region is fairly urbanized. Both the cities of
Cambridge and Salisbury (pop. 12,239 and 16,302 respectively)
,
are res-
ponsible for the processing of food products. In fact, the major source of
industrial employment are the canneries and packing houses that process
vegetables, seafood, and poultry. Sandy soils are abundant in the region
so that an extensive truck and poultry agriculture has developed (as
opposed to the dairy farming of the Upper Eastern Shore) . In addition, the
Chesapeake Bay, very rich in seafood, has provided for a most profitable
commercial business
.
The standard of living of farm operators in this region is fair. The
types of farming practiced, however, require large numbers of farm
laborers, both local and migratory, and among these people income levels
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are low. Although fishing is important in the economy, it does not generally
provide good reliable income. In addition, the industrial jobs available
have not been sufficient to absorb fully the natural population increase.
The region is 67% blue collar, 31% black, 75% rural, 3% foreign stock; the
median income is $7441 and the median educational level is 9.6 years.
The Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area ranks first in population of
the state's seven regions (1,638,086) and contains eight places inhabited
by at least twenty thousand persons. Note that the area contains Anne
Arundel and Baltimore counties, and Baltimore City.
Baltimore City is Southern in cultural background but has acquired
a degree of heavy industry and foreign immigration which make this partic-
ular background extremely marginal. The city's trade is mostly foreign
with import tonnage predominating while the major industries process
imported raw material. Such processing includes copper, sugar, steel (the
area's largest employer) and gypsum. Another major port-related industry
is shipbuilding and repair
.
The rural portions of this region are characterized by livestock,
dairy, and poultry farming, similar to Maryland Piedmont and the Lower
Eastern Shore. The area, in total, is 86% urban, 22% black, ll%foreign
stock, 47% blue collar, with a median income level of $10,791 and a median
educational level of 11 years.
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The Washington. D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area ranks second in
population of the state’s various regions (698,323) and contains ten places
of 10,000 inhabitants or more (indicating concentration of urbanization)
.
Note that the region consists of Montgomery and Prince Georges counties
The area is the personification of suburbia, whose growth has been directly
linked with that of Washington, D.C.
,
and its many federal employees.
In general, families located in the area have been of the upper middle
and upper class income brackets while a 97.7% rate increase in population
has occurred. The region is 91% urban, 13% black, 17% foreign stock, 28%
blue collar with a median income level of $14,580 and the median educational
level, 14 years.
The second-stated purpose of this chapter is to provide a "political
sketch" of the state. In pursuit of this endeavor, we utilize political back-
ground information compiled in the Almanac of American Politics . ^
"Maryland 1" (the First Congressional District)
,
is comprised of the
Eastern Shore and much of the western shore of the Chesapeake Bay; this
district corresponds to those counties in Maryland Eastern Shore, "Upper"
and "Lower," and two of three counties in Southern Maryland (Calvert and
St. Mary's counties) . As indicated in our economic analysis, the Eastern
Shore was the scene of significant resistance to civil rights activity in the
mid-sixties, the district having voted 22% for the Wallace candidacy in 1968
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(compared to a statewide average of 14%) . However, the western shore
counties in Maryland 1 are more conventionally conservative. NOTE: See
economic analysis of Southern Maryland
.
The First District, in the sixties, was represented by conservative
Republican Rogers C.B. Morton, though the area traditionally elects con-
servative Democrats into office. NOTE: Throughout our political analysis
of the state's congressional districts, congressmen referred to were those in
office during the 1966 gubernatorial election year. Indicative of the
district's orientation toward civil rights policy was Morton's vote against
the Civil Rights Act of 1966 (providing for guarantees of nondiscriminatory
selection of federal and state jurors, and authorization for the Attorney
General to initiate desegregation suits with regard to public schools and
accommodations) . The Congressman also voted against Title IV of the Civil
Rights Act (a provision voted upon separately by the House) , which gener-
ally provided for nondiscriminatory practices in the selling and renting of
housing
.
Redistricting altered the district to the Democrats' advantage recently.,
adding more marginal, rural and suburban territory. The over-all affect
of this change was to increase conservative dominance in the area.
"Maryland 2" (the Second Congressional District) comprises the
oreater oortion of suburban Baltimore County and Harford ocuruy to the
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east (the district corresponds with the "economic areas" of Maryland Pied-
mont in part, and segments of the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area)
Baltimore County, 97% white, is composed of numerous "comfortable WASPy
suburbs," like Towson, north of the city, and industrial suburbs of Dundalk
and Sparrows Point between Baltimore City and the Chesapeake Bay
.
^
The Second District was registered a pronounced conservatism, voting
against Humphrey in 1968, and demonstrating the presence of the late
sixties' "white backlash" phenomenon (especially in Dundalk and Sparrows
Point) cast significant support for George Wallace. The district, in 1970,
was to also vote against Democratic Senatorial Candidate, Joseph Tydings-
a Kennedy style liberal.
As a rough indication of the district's political orientation, Democratic
Congressman Clarence Long voted against the "Philadelphia Plan" in 1969
(which would have required the hiring of a certain percentage of minorities
on construction projects funded by the federal government)
,
against the
welfare-refcrm-oriented "Family Assistance Plan" (which would have
provided a guaranteed annual income of 61600 for qualified families) , and
for the "Work-Stamps" provision (which would require an individual to
accept any offer of any job as a condition to receiving food stamps) .
The Representative's association with the political arm of the AFL-CIO
(the Committee on Political Education) and his general pro-labor policies,
have led some to label Mr. Long as a "domestic liberal. NOTE: In a
study conducted by Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews, the Congressman's
roll call vote was in agreement with COPE official policy on 87% of the
n
issues before the House. No doubt the Congressman's labor policies were
a direct result of his constituency in Dundalk and Sparrows Point, the
heavily blue-collar areas
.
Despite this stated district's observed conservatism, as judged by
the region's past voting record, Mr. Long supported the 1966 Civil Rights
Act, and voted for the open housing provision of Title IV.
"Maryland 3" (the Third Congressional District)
,
is the southern and
eastern portions of the city of Baltimore and part of Anne Arundel County
between Baltimore and Annapolis . The district corresponds to the Baltimore
Standard Metropolitan Area, cited in the economic area analysis. Maryland
3 contains a mixture of blacks from central Baltimore, white blue-collar
workers from east Baltimore, and a few relatively affluent and conservative
suburbanites from Anne Arundel County. Since three-quarters of the 3rd's
residents live within the city, the district has been traditionally Democratic.
The district voted 20% for Wallace in 1968 (compared to a statewide, eight
district mean of 3.4%) . The support for Wallace was most significant in white,
blue-coilar populated east Baltimore.
Democrat Edward Garmatz, the 3rd's Congressman, was considered a
liberal on domestic issues due to his pro-labor policies and general associa-
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tion with COPE. NOTE: Garmatz, in roll call analysis, was in agreement
with official COPE policy on 96% of the issues before vote in the House. In
addition, selection of three random issues upon which a perceived "liberal"
or "conservative" position could be taken, indicates that the Representative
voted "liberal"
,
i.e.
,
in favor of the aforementioned Philadelphia Plan, for
the Family Assistance Plan, and against the Work-Stamp provision.
Nevertheless, despite this "domestic liberalism," Garmatz voted
against the 1966 Civil Rights Act and against Title IV. Such behavior would
seem to be representative of constituency in east Baltimore and Anne Arundel
County in particular.
"Maryland 4" (the Fourth Congressional District)
,
comprises the
central and northeast portions of the city of Baltimore and a small part of
suburban Baltimore County; this district corresponds to the Baltimore
Standard Metropolitan Area in our economic area analysis. Within the
district are the prosperous, all-white outskirts of the city, yet a growing
proportion of blacks have been migrating . The 4th
,
with many of its
residents descendants of Irish, Italian, and Greek immigrants, all of whom
are determined to "protect their neat and comfortable homes from outsiders,"
is the most middle class, most conservative, and least Democratic of the
three congressional districts within Baltimore City (other such districts are
the Third and Seventh) .
34
Democratic Congressman George Fallon, the district’s representative,
was considered a liberal on domestic issues. This description appears to
be supported by the Congressman's pro-vote on the Family Assistance Plan.
However, where the 1966 Civil Rights Bill and Title IV of the bill were con-
cerned, Mr. Fallon registered a vote against the proposed legislation.
"Maryland 5" (the Fifth Congressional District)
,
is comprised of
Prince Georges County (corresponding to the Washington Standard Metro-
politan Area) and Charles County (corresponding to Southern Maryland)
.
Wealthy, white-collar oriented Prince Georges County, with many of its
residents employed by the federal government-although not to the extent
of neighboring Montgomery County- is Democratic by a 2 to 1 margin.
Yet in recent statewide elections, the county's residents, "still upward
-
9
striving and insecure," have found the conservative position on law and
order most attractive. Later, in 1970, Senator Joseph Tydings, the
previously mentioned liberal, was to carry this county by only 54%.
Charles County, given to the Southern economic and cultural tradi-
tion, as was mentioned, has followed a rurally conservative political pattern.
The county voted 26% for the Wallace candidacy in 1963 (compared to a
statewide figure of 14%) . The economic, cultural, and political orientations
of these two counties, comprising Maryland's Fifth, indeed represent an
unusual contrast. NOTE: 26% support for Wallace in Charles County was the
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third largest percentage of votes received by the candidate of the state's
twenty-two counties
.
The 5th 's congressman was conservative Democrat Hervey Mac’nen who
was to be ousted in 1968 by conservative, lav/ and order candidate,
Republican Lawrence Hogan, an ex-FBI agent; (Machen voted against the
Civil Rights Act of 1966 and against Title IV of the bill)
.
Hogan's victory
over Machen appeared to reflect an attraction for the former's law and order
campaign while the conservative Democrat seemed to fall victim to the fact
that "he thought he had the district safely put away."^ Most significant is
that the defeat of Machen did not demonstrate a weakening of conservative
ideology in the Fifth District since Hogan, in 1970, was to crush an out-
spoken liberal Democrat with 62% of the vote.
In addition, indicative of the district's political ideology, analysis of
the Republican's roll call behavior indicates agreement with the liberal,
social welfare oriented "Americans for Democratic Action" on only 22% of
issues voted upon; 25% agreement with COPE (this has implications for the
Congressman's, generally, anti-labor policies) ; but 56% agreement with
the conservative, anti-social welfare oriented "Americans for Constitutional
Action." Yet Mr. Hogan is on record as voting for the Philadelphia Plan and
for Family Assistance.
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So that Maryland 5 politically, appears to reflect a mixture of mostly
conservative (especially with regard to law and order)
,
usually Democratic
Prince Georges County, where close proximity to Washington, D.C.'s
federal bureaucracy has accounted for traces of liberalism, and rural
Charles County, whose great attraction for George Wallace is indicative of
the county's Southern, conservative tradition.
"Maryland 6" (the Sixth Congressional District)
,
is the western pan-
handle of the state, extending from the Appalachian Mountains around Cum-
berland to the suburban reaches of greater Baltimore and Washington; the
district corresponds to Western Maryland and portions of Maryland Piedmont
in our economic analysis. The district, though once accurately character-
ized as conservative and Republican, appeared in the sixties as more
Republican than conservative. In 1966, the 6th district was represented by
liberal Republican Charles Mathias Jr.
,
who had served the region since
1960. Brief analysis of the Republican's vote on selected issues indicates a
liberal political orientation. In addition to supporting the Philadelphia Plan,
the Congressman voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1966 as well as Title IV
.
Analysis of roll call record demonstrates that Mr. Mathias agreed with the
official policy taken by the liberal Americans for Democratic Action on 78%
of the issues before vote; an 83% agreement rate with COPE; and only an 11%
agreement rate with the conservative Americans for Constitutional Action.
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"Maryland 7" (the Seventh Congressional District)
,
includes most
of west Baltimore, as well as a substantial portion of suburban Baltimore
County . The 7th is the heartland of the city's large Jewish population which
is steadily moving out into the suburbs. Blacks are now a majority in the
city portion of the 7th, but are a minority district-wide, since the suburbs
are almost entirely white.
From 1952 to 1970, the district, a perennial Democratic stronghold,
was represented by Samuel Friedel, a loyal supporter of the Baltimore
City Democratic organization
.
11 NOTE: The district, since the immediate
post WW II period, has consistently voted Democratic with the exception of
1966 (the gubernatorial race)
,
when Republican Spiro Agnew defeated
1
o
Democratic, anti-open housing candidate George Mahoney. Friedel,
considered to be a liberal domestically, is on record as voting for the
Philadelphia Plan, for the 1966 Civil Rights Act, and for Title IV of the 1966
Act. In 1970, the 7th district was to elect black Congressman Parren Mitchell
into office, reflecting the increased percentage of blacks in the area. This
change in the composition of the 7th' s population was a trend that first be-
came massive during Friedel's latter years in office, dating back to the mid-
sixties .
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"Maryland 8" (the Eighth Congressional District)
,
is liberal, upper
middle class to upper class Montgomery County where many residents are
employed by the federal bureaucracy. NOTE: See the economic analysis
of the Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area for a description of
pertinent SES factors. The eighth is also comprised of small portions of
more conservative Howard and Anne Arundel counties to the north and east.
As befits a district dominated by the socio-economic characteristics
of Montgomery County, both the local Democratic and Republican parties
are the most liberal in the state. Since 1966, the district has been repre-
sented by Gilbert Gude, an anti-war Republican who has an agreement rate
with the Americans for Democratic Action, higher than that of many Maryland
Democrats (74%) . The Congressman's rate of agreement with COPE on major
issues before vote in the House is 83%, and only 25% with respect to the
Americans for Constitutional Action. The Representative, further indicat-
ing a liberal orientation on domestic issues, voted for the Philadelphia Flan,
for the Family Assistance Plan, against the Work-Stamp provision and for
the 1966 Civil Rights Act. Despite this "across-the-board" liberal record,
however. Congressman Gude voted against the open housing provision
(Title IV)
,
of the Civil Rights Act. One final note is that the 8th District
supported the Wallace candidacy in 1968, by only 8%, the least amount of
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support registered for the Alabama governor of the state's eight congres-
sional districts
.
In conclusion, our purpose here has been to brief the reader on basic
economic and political characteristics of Maryland. By investigation of the
state's economic areas, i.e.
,
each region's occupational foundation, racial
and ethnic composition, and other pertinent data, we have an admittedly
"rough indication" of electoral behavior given a particular issue. The
generalized nature of our conclusion based upon economic area analysis is
emphasized
.
In investigation of Maryland's congressional districts, we are
presented with the opportunity to make an educated guess about a particular
election based upon knowledge of district political ideology and background
.
In addition, although the terms by which congressmen have been labelled,
i.e. "liberal," "conservative," are admittedly ambiguous (as are the
implications of a vote on the Philadelphia Plan, Family Assistance Plan, or
Work-Stamp provision)
,
such techniques do allow the reader to become
acquainted with the general ideological orientations of each district in the
state. The generalized nature of our conclusion, based upon a description
of political background is also emphasized.
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Most significant, departing from the pattern of generalized conclu-
sions, knowledge of each representative's vote on the Civil Rights Act of
1966, specifically the Title IV open occupancy provision, permits a relatively
accurate ability to "predict" electoral behavior, given the 1966 gubernatorial
election. If the thesis of Miller and Stokes cited in Chapter One is accepted,
i.e.
,
if congressmen do represent constituency attitudes on civil rights
issues, then roll call vote on Title IV of the 1966 Civil Rights Act should
serve as an accurate indicator of district electoral behavior given an election
where open occupancy is the key issue. Before examination of this "con-
clusion-based hypothesis," one major, technical problem must first be
addressed
.
Since our concern deals with permitting both educated assumption and
accurate prediction vis-a-vis a gubernatorial election (especially from
analysis of the Title IV provision)
,
to facilitate the purpose of this chapter,
the aforementioned "congressional district" must be transposed into the
county-oriented discussion of Maryland's "economic areas." So that keeping
in mind the political backgrounds of the respective districts, the transposi-
tion appears as thus:
FIRST CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
Economic Areas: "Upper" and "Lower Eastern Shore; two of three counties
in Southern MaTyland; southern Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area
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Counties : Cecil, Kent, Queen Annes, Caroline, Dorchester, Wicomico,
Worcester, Somerset, St. Gary's, Calvert, east and southern Anne Arundel
SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
Economic Are as: Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area; smaller portion of
Maryland Piedmont
Counties : Baltimore County, Harford County
THIRD CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
Economic Areas : Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area
Counties : northern Anne Arundel County, southern and eastern Baltimore
City
FOURTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
Economic Areas : Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area
Counties : central and northern Baltimore City; small portion of south-
eastern Baltimore County
FIFTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
Economic Areas: southern portion of Washington, D. C. Standard Metro-
politan Area and the western-most portion of Southern Maryland
Counties: Prince Georges and Charles counties
SIXTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
Economic Areas: Western Maryland and Piedmont Maryland (except for
Harford County and southern Howard County)
Counties : Garrett, Allegany, Washington, Frederick, Carroll counties,
northern Howard County
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SEVENTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
Economic Areas : Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area
Counties : northern Baltimore City; small portion of southwest Baltimore
County
EIGHTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
Economic Areas : northern portion of the Washington, D.C. Standard Metro-
politan Area; small portion of Maryland Piedmont; small portion of Baltimore
Standard Metropolitan Area
Counties : Montgomery County, southern Howard County, western Anne
Arundel County
Given this transposition, we earlier stated that congressmen from the
First, Third, and Fourth Districts voted against the Title IV provision of the
1966 Civil Rights Act. A preview of electoral behavior in the 1966 guber-
natorial race demonstrates that the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area
(corresponding to districts Three and Four)
,
cast majority support for the
Democratic, anti-open occupancy candidate George Mahoney. In addition,
both "Upper" and "Lower" Eastern Shore Maryland (corresponding to the
First District)
,
voted for the Democrat, Mahoney. Simultaneously, Western
Maryland and Maryland Piedmont (corresponding to the Sixth District in
which Representative Mathias cast support for Title IV) , voted for Republi-
can Agnew in the gubernatorial race, the perceived liberal on open occu-
pancy. So that knowledge of district orientation toward the Title IV pro-
vision of the 1966 Civil Rights Act enables us to easily predict electoraj.
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behavior in corresponding economic areas relative to the 1966 governor's
race, given the issue of open occupancy.
Ability to predict electoral behavior given knowledge of roll call
vote on Title IV in the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Districts is
somewhat more limited. Congressmen in both the Second and Seventh Dis-
tricts voted for the Title IV provision despite the fact that a preview of 1566
election results indicates that the districts' corresponding economic area,
the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area, voted for anti-open housing
candidate Mahoney. In all probability, it is the affect of the Maryland
Piedmont constituency (which comprises a portion of the Second District)
,
that accounted for Congressman Long's vote in favor of Title IV. Where
the Seventh District is concerned, even though located in an economic
area supportive of the anti-open housing candidate, the large population of
blacks and Jews probably accounted for Congressman Friedel's affirmative
vote on open occupancy.
Concerning the Fifth District (corresponding to the Washington, D.C.
Metropolitan economic area and a portion of Southern Maryland) , the vote
against Title IV of the 1966 bill appears to be a direct influence of the mix-
ture between rurally conservative Southern Maryland and a less than
"totally liberal" Prince Georges County. NOTE: We previously mentioned
that Prince Georges County, one of two counties in the liberal Washington,
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D. C. suburban area, is not liberal on domestic issues to the degree of its
neighbor, Montgomery County. This was indicated in analysis of the Fifth
and Eighth Congressional Districts
.
The Eighth Congressional District (corresponding to the Washington,
D.C
.
Metropolitan Area; specifically Montgomery County and portions of
Howard County and Anne Arundel County)
,
illustrates our inability to
predict the electoral behavior of the state's economic areas from knowledge
of district vote on Title IV, with total accuracy. Given the dominant
existence of Montgomery County, with respect to the Eighth Congressional
District (as opposed to the Fifth District where there appeared no dominance
but an ideological mixture between Prince Georges County and Southern
oriented Charles County)
,
we would expect an affirmative vote by Congress-
man Gude on Title IV. Such an expectation is enhanced by subsequent
electoral behavior which saw the county heavily reject the anti-open housing
candidate, George Mahoney in the 1966 governor's election.
If our analysis appears somewhat complex, we can sum up the purpose
and conclusion of this chapter in the following manner:
1) generally, to acquaint the reader with Maryland's economic areas, thus
permitting "educated assumptions" relative to electoral behavior given an
issue (s)
2) generally, to familiarize the reader with the state's polical background,
thus enabling an "educated assumption" about electoral behavior given an
issue (s)
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3) specifically, to enable one to predict with accuracy, electoral behavior
in the 1966 gubernatorial election, where open occupancy was the key issue,
given knowledge of district vote on the open occupancy provision to the
Civil Rights Act of 1966 (Title IV)
Such a prediction was possible where four of the state's eight districts
were concerned
.
We attempted to give an explanation as to why electoral
behavior could not be accurately predicted in the governor's race (by
economic area)
,
simply from knowledge of the district's vote on Title TV
where such predictions were found not to be possible. NOTE: The technique
of predicting electoral behavior in the 1966 gubernatorial election from
knowledge of congressional vote on Title IV of the 1966 Civil Rights Bill is
chronologically valid since the open housing provision was voted upon by
the House in August, three months before the election.
*
CHAPTER III
THE DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY
The hope of Governor Millard Tawes that the Democratic party could
unite under the middle-of-the road banner of Attorney General Thomas
Finan appeared to be challenged early by the expression of U.S. Senator
Joseph Tydings who openly doubted that the party "can avoid a factional
fight in the primary." * Finan, with support of the state's established
political organizations, ran on his record as attorney general. Carlton
Sickles, congressman-at-large and supported by Tydings, assumed the
reformer's role to put integrity back into state government. George Mahoney,
"for nearly two decades a political spectacular but unsuccessful candidate,
again dismissed by the political unwary," based his campaign against en-
O
forced open occupancy. Clarence Miles, attorney and banker, proposed
changes within the tax system and advocated a general policy of government
thrift.
The 1966 Maryland Democratic Primary can be analyzed in terms of six
major issues addressed by the candidates and their selection of campaign
strategy. Positions on the issues of tax reform, increased state aid to educa-
tion, selected salary increases, crime prevention, and prevention of waste
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in government appear as both ambiguous and strikingly similar. The
Baltimore Sun
,
appaiently recognizing these latter characteristics, stated in
an editorial that the Maryland Democrat should beware of "political hot air
3poisoning The single issue upon which definite stands by the candidates
were taken was that of open occupancy. In fact, a statewide League of Women
Voters questionnaire, submitted to candidates running for office at every
level, indicated that attitudes on integrated housing were more polarized
than any other issue. Specifically, it was the candidacy of George Mahoney,
millionaire paving contractor, that assisted in making open housing a salient
issue
.
THE MAHONEY CANDIDACY
The platform George Mahoney adopted in the primary consisted of a
single plank, that of an unequivocal opposition to open occupancy. The
candidate maintained that, if elected, he would work against open occupan-
cy legislation; if such legislation was passed, he would veto it. In fact,
throughout the campaign it became a favorite tactic of Mr. Mahoney to
suggest to potential supporters that "if an open housing law passes, federal
lawyers will beat on you, you'll be in real bad trouble. Additionally, the
candidate advised Maryland Democrats that the right to sell or rent one's
home should not be interfered with by the federal government. This,
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claimed Mahoney, was the only issue in the campaign. Probably in response
to this latter assertion by Mr. Mahoney, the Baltimore Sun commented in the
following manner:
"Mr. Mahoney's case is a special one, not only requiring close
consideration but crying for it. The nature of his campaign with
its bald appeal to the greatest backward prejudices of voters
illustrates.
.
.this candidate's utter incapacity for elective
office. A principal responsibility of the Democratic party in
this primary is to make sure that Mr. Mahoney does not by any
chance become Governor of Maryland. "5
Analysis of the candidate's positions on other issues lends validity to
the assertion of ambiguity and ultimate similarity existent in the campaign.
Mr. Mahoney stressed the need for increased crime control noting "the new
age of savagery." The candidate pointed to the restrictions placed upon
state law enforcement agencies by the federal government, the leniency on
criminals by the courts, and various organizations such as the Civilian
Review Board as a cause for the increased crime rate in the state.
Mr. Mahoney appeared to have at least one interpretation for the increased
crime rate, but presented no viable solutions to the problem, thus prompting
the Sun to again comment that "Mr. Mahoney has failed to discuss the real
issues in a specific and forthright manner. Where the issue of taxes wras
concerned, the candidate proposed the elimination of duplication, e.g.
,
dispensing with the Baltimore City Departments of Health and Public Works,
and placing such services with the responsibility of the state. No reference
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was made to the Cooper-Hughes Tax Amendment, a controversial graduated
tax proposal which levied from 3 to 6 percent tax on incomes, though the
candidate indicated opposition to the present, unpopular property ana
earnings taxes. Finally, Mr. Mahoney took, what can be labelled as the
"expected position" on education (similar to the stance other candidates
would take)
,
by stating the necessity for increased state aid to education,
and increased salaries for teachers and law enforcement officials. Mo spec-
ific monetary figures were offered.
Clearly, the political strategy of the Mahoney candidacy was based
upon his open occupancy position. The Sun had suggested that Mr
. Mahoney
was counting on the issue of open housing to get elected. Specifically, the
strategy of this Democratic hopeful dictated taking the perceived popular
stand on a major, single, controversial issue and remain vague on other
issues. To other candidates in the primary race, Mr. Mahoney became the
"single-issue candidate," whose campaign in the words of rival Clarence
Miles, was based upon "racial hatred." However, where significant num-
bers of Maryland Democrats were concerned, Mr. Mahoney was simply the
"anti-open occupancy candidate," whatever its implications. Such a voter
perception was the key to the Mahoney success in the primary.
It was aforementioned that the strategy of the Mahoney candidacy
was to capitalize on the open occupancy issue . Indeed , open housing was to
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become the salient issue in the primary as later anlaysis indicates. Logically,
the platform adopted by a candidate, and his perception of the popular and/or
"correct" stand on the key issue (s)
,
can determine electoral victory or defeat.
Our point is that Mahoney's victory in the primary is indicative of the
candidate's accurate evaluation of the affect of open occupancy as an issue
and the correct or popular position maintained. Subsequent analysis of other
candidates' strategies will indicate platforms based on considerations other
than that of open housing; strategies that proved a failure. In essence,
Mahoney diluted the potency of all other issues in the campaign upon which
opposition candidates based their strategies
.
Electoral analysis appears to support the salient nature of the open
occupancy question . Mahoney was to compile 55% of the vote in Southern
Maryland, 30% of the vote in Upper Eastern Shore Maryland, and 38% in the
Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area. Previous politico-economic descrip-
tion of these regions suggested a rural, Southern-oriented cultural
tradition in these two former areas, and a general ethnic conservatism within
the latter region; (see Chapter Two) . A quantitative analysis of the primary,
conducted by Dr. Robert Leevy of Maryland's Goucher College indicated
significant support for Mahoney as a result of the "white backlash." The
Political Scientist suggests that Mr. Mahoney won the primary due to the
favorable reaction for his candidacy in the white precincts of Baltimore
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City and County
,
where voters had an average of seven to eight years of
education and were classified as low to moderate income groups. In addition,
given a four candidate race, Mr. Mahoney received an amazing 46% of the
white working class vote in Baltimore City and 69% of the Slavic vote. 7
Our own quantitative analysis, very generally, appears to support
the findings of Dr. Leevy. Pearson's Correlation statistical technique
indicates that 27% of the variance in Mahoney's vote can be explained by the
percent vote for Wallace in a given region. Note: Here we imply a positive
association between preference for the segregationist policies of George
Wallace in 1964 and attraction for Mahoney's anti-open housing stance. In
addition, 15% of the variance in the Mahoney vote is explained by percent
black in an area (where the greater the black population in a majority white
region, the greater the white attraction for George Mahoney) ; 8% of the
variance in the candidate's vote is explained by percent urban (where the
greater the urban concentration, the less likely the Mahoney vote); this
appears likely due to the influence of those areas that voted most heavily
for the candidate, i.e.
,
rural Southern Maryland (55%) and rural Upper
Eastern Shore Maryland (30%) . The Mahoney vote is also characterized by
areas of lower foreign stock concentration (which explains 6% of the variance
in the candidate's vote, a negative relationship indicating the greater the
foreign stock concentration, the less likely a vote for Mahoney); lower
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median income (which explains 6% of the variance in the Mahoney vote, a
negative relationship indicating the lower the median income the greater
the vote for the candidate)
;
percent rural concentration (which explains
6% of the variance in the Mahoney vote, where a positive association is
apparent)
; lower median educational level and lower concentration of white
collar occupations (which each explain 4% respectively of the variance in
the vote for this candidate)
. Finally, the percent blue collar concentration
in a given area explains 2% of the variance in Mr. Mahoney's vote, a positive
relationship indicating a tendency for Mahoney support among blue collar
workers
.
Multiple Regression analysis allows us to explain 35% of the Mahoney
g
vote. As noted, 27% of the variance is explained by the percent vote
for Wallace in 1964 (a positive association existing between the two
variables)
.
Knowledge of percent rural concentration, in addition to the
Wallace vote variable allows an increase in explanatory authority to 29%
(percent rural concentration is equal to an R Square Change of .01677) .
The variable, percent black, in addition to knowledge of percent Wallace
vote and percent rural concentration, allov/s an explanatory capacity of
30% (percent black being equal to an R Square Change of .01284) . Percent
white collar, given knowledge of the aforementioned variables, permits an
explanatory capacity of 32% (this latter variable equal to an R Square Change
53
value of .02451)
. Median income level, given the above SES-demographic
information, permits an explanatory authority of 34% (the variable, median
income, accounting for an R Square Change of .01915) . Other variables
with respect to the Mahoney vote, account for less than one percent increase
in explanatory capacity although median educational level, representing an
R Square Change of .00816, enables us to explain the vote for Mahoney,
given other knowledge, by approximately 35%. Given the selected variaoies
of percent vote for Wallace, percent rural concentration, percent black,
percent white collar, median income, median educational level, percent
foreign stock, percent urban concentration, percent blue collar, the former
five variables appear most significant, as judged by R Square Change value,
in determining explanatory authority with respect to the Mahoney vote.
Characteristics Indicative of Support for Mahoney
a) high concentration of blacks
b) lower median income levels
c) lower median educational level
d) higher concentration of blue collar occupations
e) lower concentration of foreign stock
f) lower urban concentration
g) high rural concentration
h) lower concentration of white collar occupations
i) high percent Wallace vote in the 1964 primary
Note: SES-demographic descriptions are relative to the state mean.
Significant indicators of the Mahoney vote, as judged by R Square
Change value are as follows: (in rank order)
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a) percent vote for Wallace
b) percent rural, concentration
c) percent black population
d) percent white collar
e) median income level
In sum, given the first place showing of Mr. Mahoney in Southern,
rurally conservative Upper Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland and the
traditionally conservative and "white backlash" areas within the Baltimore
Standard Metropolitan region, open occupancy as a civil rights question
appears to have been the key issue in determining electoral preference.
This assertion is supported by both the quantitative study conducted by
Dr. Robert Leevy and our own analysis as well . The latter effort indicated
the Mahoney vote to be distinguished, in addition to other factors, by areas
of high black population concentration (thus, theoretically, permitting open
occupancy to appear as a relevant issue to voters) , and by areas which
demonstrated "significant" support (i.e.
,
greater support than the state
mean) for the Wallace candidacy-.
The political strategy of George Mahoney, in the primary, appeared
successful, though he won with only 33% of the vote. (Indeed the four
candidate race probably permitted his victory; this question we will later
address) . For the present, the candidate was able to take a definite stand
on a controversial issue, i.e.
,
open occupancy, choose the perceived
popular stand, and win the primary based upon his position on the issue.
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Thus one might argue that "political expediency" was a key to the Mahoney
success in the primary.
THE SICKLES CANDIDACY
Mahoney's chief opposition in the Democratic primary came from
44 yr. old Congressman-at-Large Carlton Sickles, the only candidate
unconditionally supporting open occupancy. It was Sickles whom the
Baltimore Sun described as "the darling of the liberals,"^ and the Salis-
bury Times
,
an Eastern Shore Newspaper, referred to as "the spokesman
of labor. The Congressman ran on a platform of "quality government,"
pointing to the corrupt, inefficient Tawes Administration and the political
bossism of Democratic financial contributor George Hocker, a millionaire
brewery king. Sickles had frequently stated that the necessity for quality
government was the chief issue in the campaign. On other issues, the
candidate proposed an end to the unpopular income and earnings tax (as did
Mahoney)
,
and an increase in corporate taxes with a simultaneous phasing
out of taxes on business personal property. Sickles, in addition, proposed
a tax reform plan which he stated would be based upon a revision of the
Cooper-Hughes proposal, rejected by the State Legislature in 1965. In
retrospect, the tax reform proposals of Mr. Sickles appear somewhat more
comprehensive than that of Mr. Mahoney, yet in the final analysis, signifi-
cant difference is not apparent . Both candidates were opposed to the
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unpopular earnings and local income taxes; one candidate favored tax
reform based upon a revision of the Cooper-Hughes plan, the other candi-
date did not address the issue.
Mr. Sickles adopted the expected position on the question of state
aid to education and increased salaries for selected occupations. The Con-
gressman proposed additional funds to be provided by the state (as Mahoney
had proposed)
,
although Sickles, unlike Mahoney, emphasized the necessity
of school construction in Baltimore City in particular. Note that the
candidate suggested a $1500 grant for each child in the public school system,
an increase of $1430 from the present $70 grant per child by the state!
Such a proposal prompted Sickles' opponents, especially Mr. Miles, to label
the Congressman as a "candidate in sneakers," i.e.
,
running on a "promise-
them-anything" platform.^ In addressing the question of increased salaries
for law enforcement officials, Mr. Sickles cited a proposal calling for a
minimum of $5600 to $6000 for Baltimore City police, a plan somewhat more
specific than that suggested by Mr. Mahoney. In sum, however, where
issues other than that of open occupancy are concerned, there appears little
difference on positions taken by Sickles and Mahoney. If "differences" did
exist, voters considered such variances to be minor; alternatively, signifi-
cant differences may have been perceived on what voters considered minor
issues. For example, Congressman Sickles emphasized a particular need
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for state aid to education for Baltimore City yet the candidate placed second
to Mr. Mahoney who frequently spoke of the incompetencies of city politicians
and public officials as a reason for Baltimore's financial problems; Mahoney
received 34% of the vote in Baltimore City, Sickles, 32%. In indicating a
preference for a tax reform plan, Sickles, as it was noted, suggested a
revision of the Cooper-Hughes proposal which in 1965, had been defeated
in the State Legislature due to its unpopularity with the wealthier counties
(the plan called for a graduated tax system ranging from a 3 to 6 percent
levy)
. Yet the Congressman won the two most rich counties in the state,
faired well in a third
,
but not so in the more marginal areas where such a
tax structure might expect to meet with support. Note: In fact, a signifi-
cant portion of the Cooper-Hughes tax plan was devised by State Senator
12
Harry Hughes from marginal Caroline County.
In low-income Southern Maryland, where unemployment is highest in
the state, and housing most inadequate, the Congressman had cited the
necessity for increased employment opportunities and additional low cost
housing while Mr. Mahoney stressed the issue of integrated housing.
Despite this, Mr. Sickles received 13% of the primary vote compared to
Mr. Mahoney's 55%.
Given the above examples, we maintain that the issue of open occu-
pancy polarized the Mahoney and Sickles candidacies—no other issue. The
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voter acceptance or rejection of the Sickles candidacy was based upon an
issue other than that which was the key plank and therefore the major
strategy of his campaign. This, it is suggested, lessened the possibilities
of the Congressman's potential victory. On the other hand, and to his
benefit, the Mahoney candidacy was based upon an acceptance or rejection
of his open occupancy stand--an issue and a position which he voluntarily
associated himself with. Sickles, possibly to his disadvantage, became
labelled as the candidate "unconditionally in favor of open housing," a
question he stated was secondary to the necessity of quality government. It
is no coincidence that the two candidates most polarized on the issue of open
housing placed first and second in a four candidate primary election;
(Mahoney with 33% of the vote, Sickles 32%) .
We previously referred to Mr. Sickles and his attachment to organized
labor. Brief mention of the sources of the candidate's financial support
indicate funding from the Citizenship Fund of the United Auto Workers, the
Labor Fund-Raising Committee for Carlton Sickles, the Education Fund-Rais-
ing of the United Steel Workers, and the Maryland State Committee on
Political Education, the political arm of the AFL-CIO. Yet Sickles was to
ultimately suffer from his association with organized labor. A B altimore Sun
editorial suggested that Sickles was "too Washington-oriented to have
acquired any profound and detailed knowledge of the state and his debt to
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labor may be too great at a time when the pressures of labor's demands
may well be working against the general interest." 13 Perhaps such con-
demnation of the Sickles candidacy due to its ties with labor would have been
meaningless if Mr. Sickles had received the support of labor's rank and file.
Yet he did not. In fact, the candidate received only 14% of the vote in the
white, working class precincts in Baltimore City and County compared to
46% for Mahoney. 14 It was these areas that in a quantitative analysis of the
primary, Dr. Robert Leevy classified as regions of "white backlash." It
is further suggested, given our own analyses and observations, that
Mr. Sickles position on open occupancy cost him the support of the white
working class despite the support of organized labor, and as a candidate
dependent upon labor for support, such a position cost him the election.
Very simply, organized labor could not deliver the vote to the Congressman
due to the saliencv of the open housing question.
In retrospect, the blueprint of the liberal's campaign strategy was
fairly clear. In adopting as the central issue the necessity for qualtiy
government and attacking the inefficiency and corruption of the incumbent
Tawes Administration
,
the Congressman considered incumbent Attorney
General Thomas Finan as chief Democratic rival, net Mr. Mahoney. Under-
standably enough, what before the primary campaign had been referred to
as the inefficient and corrupt "Tawes -Hocker Regime," by Mr. Sickles,
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during the campaign was labelled as the "Tawes-Hccker-Finan Regime." 15
It can be argued that the Congressman's campaign strategy was similar
to the "throw the rascals out" platform proved to be successful by Senator
Tydings of Maryland
. Yet the Sun suggests that the question of open
occupancy prevented such a strategy from being a success, given Mr. Sickles
position on the subject of integrated housing. In sum, the political strategy
of Sickles was both misdirected (in that he dismissed the potential attraction
for the Mahoney candidacy given open occupancy)
,
and ineffective (since
the candidate was not perceived as a "pro-quality government" advocate, but
a candidate in favor of unconditional open housing)
.
Yet the candidacy of this particular Democratic hopeful tailed by only
1%. Quantitative analysis enables an evaluation of support rendered for the
candidate. Note that Sickles finished first in only one of seven economic
areas within the state, yet he won by a wide margin of 31% in the liberal
Washington, D.G. suburban area. The closeness of the election is due to the
candidate's strong second place finish in several of the state's more populated
areas, i.e., the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area and Maryland Piedmont.
A Pearson's Correlation study indicates that 12% of the variance in the Sickles
vote is explained by percent black concentration where a "negative r" exists,
i.e.
,
the greater the black population in a given area, the less likely a vote
for Sickles. Several comments are in order here. We previously stated
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that Mr. Mahoney received votes from areas of high black concentration, i.e.
where the issue of open occupancy is politically relevant. Given the identi-
cal logic, Sickles received votes from, especially, liberal, wealthy Mont-
gomery and Prince Georges Counties, where the population of blacks is
minimal. Here, the issue of open housing was not given the same degree of
potential conflict, relative to other areas within the state. We emphasize,
however, that Mr. Sickles was still identified as the candidate in favor of
unconditional open occupancy. Though a negative relationship exists
between the variable, percent black, and the Sickles vote, the candidate
received 70% of the black vote in regions of 90 to 100 percent black popula-
tion; however, this figure was substantially lower than that support the Con
gressman had anticipated . Political observers had concluded before the
primary election that the black vote would be split between Sickles and
Mr
.
Finan
.
Fifty-seven percent of the variance in the Sickles vote is explained
by median income, where a positive association exists, i.e.
,
the greater
the median income in a given area, the greater the potential vote for the
Congressman; likewise, the less the median income, the less probable
support for the candidate. Fifty-one percent of the variance in the
candidate's vote is explained by median educational level, where a positive
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relationship is apparent; 48% of the variance in this particular vote is
explained by percent blue collar, where a negative association exists (this
appears to reflect Sickles inability to garner the support of labor's rank and
file previously noted)
; 60% of the variance in the Congressman's vote is
explained by percent foreign stock, a positive association evident; 49% of
the variance is explained by percent urban, a positive association existing
between the two variables; 32% of the variance in the candidate's vote is
explained by percent rural concentration, where a negative relationship is
evident; 48% of the variance in the Sickles vote is explained by percent
white collar concentration, where a positive association exists; and 32% of
the variance in the candidate's vote is explained by areas having "signifi-
cantly" (greater than the state mean) voted for the candidacy of George
Wallace, where a negative r is apparent.
Multiple Regression analysis enables us to explain 75% of the Sickles
vote. As we noted, 60% of the variance in the candidate's vote is explained
by percent foreign stock.
A significant foreign stock population, as indicative of support for
the Sickles candidacy, reflects the liberal's sole but overwhelming electoral
victory in the Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area. The Candidate
compiled 49% of the vote in this region compared to 18% for runner-up
Thomas Finan. Foreign stock concentration is the most significant variable
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in attempting to explain the Sickles vote (judged by Multiple Regression
analysis)
,
in that l/-s of the population in the aforementioned economic area
is comprised of non-natives; (compared to a state mean of 6%) . It is this
region that represents the greatest variance in foreign stock population
relative to the statewide average, and likewise the most substantial popula-
tion of this particular group in the state.
Yet a comprehensive evaluation of the Sickles vote must necessarily
consider other SES-demographic characteristics, particularly of the
Washington Standard Metropolitan region, since the candidate's support
originated primarily from that area. Specifically, the little registered
support for the 1964 Wallace candidacy (29% compared to 44% for the state
average)
,
a high median income level and high urban concentration, all
represent significant R Square Change values (and therefore, are important
variables in accounting for the Sickles vote) . In sum, knowledge of addi-
tional variables, even where foreign stock appears as the major explantory
element, assists in evaluating the affect of the latter upon electoral prefer-
ence. For example; although Multiple Regression, analysis indicated that
percent foreign stock did not possess a noteworthy R Square Change value
(less than 1%) in the determination of the Mahoney vote, the candidate
received 69% of Baltimore City's Slavic vote. Further investigation would
reveal that a substantial number of the city's foreign stock is classified as
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blue collar
,
lower median income and lower median educational level; these
variables typifying support for the Mahoney candidacy
. This we compare
to the white collar, higher median income and educational level of the Wash-
ington region's foreign stock population.
In considering the differentiated electoral choice demonstrated by
the Slavic vote in Baltimore City and the foreign stock vote in the
Washington area, additional SES variables and the substantial role of the
"traditional liberalism" of the latter region, appear to have a primary affect
upon influencing candidate selection. NOTE: See the politico-economic
discussion of the Washington region's "liberalism" in Chapter Two.
In essence, with respect to the Sickles vote, substantial segments of
the foreign stock population
,
similar to other voters in this economic region
won by the Congressman-at-Large
,
have a liberal political orientation. The
foreign stock variable becomes significant in explaining Sickles' support
given the group's important numerical presence in this particular area.
Returning to our initial Multiple Regression analysis of the Sickles
vote, additional knowledge of a region's vote for Wallace, given percent
foreign stock, enables us to explain 72% of the candidate's vote (the
Wallace variable accounting for an R Square Change of .11675 or approximate-
ly 12%); knowledge of the area's median income level allows us to explain
73% of the candidate's vote, given the above variables (median income level
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accounting for an R Square Change of .01590); finally, percent urban con-
centration, given the aforementioned variables, enables one to explain
74% of the Congressman's vote for governor. The variables percent rural,
percent black, and median educational level, together, account for an R
Square Change value of approximately 1%.
Characteristics Indicative of Support for Sickles
a) lower concentration of blacks
b) higher median income level
c) higher median educational level
d) lower concentration of blue collar occupations
e) high concentration of foreign stock
f) high urban concentration
g) low rural concentration
h) high concentration of white collar occupations
i) low concentration of Wallace support
Significant indicators of the Sickles vote, as judged by the R Square
Change statistic: (in rank order)
a) percent foreign stock
b) percent vote for Wallace
c) median income level
d) percent urban concentration
In conclusion, the polarized relationship between the Mahoney and
Sickles candidacies is emphasized. Quantitative analysis indicates that,
without exception, where characteristics indicative of the Mahoney vote
exist (e.g., high concentration of blacks, lower median incomes, etc.) ,
the reciprocal is true of areas supportive of the Sickles candidacy . Again,
this is the case with all nine of our selected SES-demographic variables.
66
In no other case, with respect to other candidates, does this reciprocal
relationship emerge without exception. Furthermore, we maintain the exist-
ence of this association to be a result of each candidate's "extreme" or
polarized position on open occupancy.
Finally, the shortcomings of the Sickles campaign strategy is stressed.
The candidate was perceived as a candidate in favor of unconditional open
occupancy, an issue he claimed wras secondary in importance to that of
quality government. In essence, Mr. Sickles was judged on an issue
strategically evaluated best by Mr. Mahoney. So that forced to take a
position on open housing due to the Mahoney candidacy, the liberal, labor
candidate's stand cost him substantial electoral support in this four-candi-
date primary
.
THE FINAN CANDIDACY
Incumbent Attorney General Thomas Finan campaigned on a vague
platform which cited the past accomplishments of the Tawes Administration,
and stated the necessity of tax reform in the state. With regard to the re-
structuring of the tax system, Mr. Finan proposed a "modified" version of
the Cooper-Hughes Tax Amendment; note Sickles desire for a "revision" of
the Amendment earlier discussed. In addition, the Attorney General stressed
the need for increased state aid to education, an increase of $240 per pupil.
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In an unmistakably ambiguous manner, the candidate proposed increased
in the salaries of teachers and lav/ enforcement officials, cited the need for
a strengthened conflict of interest law (a key plank of the Miles candidacy)
,
and offered a plan to assault the problem of pollution in the Chesapeake Bay.
Confronted by the candidacy of George Mahoney the candidate was
compelled to take a definite position on open occupancy. Mr. Finan, at this
time, declared a desire for open occupancy only where commercially owned
homes were concerned. "The solution to the problem of housing," he had
said, "is adequate housing at low cost with long term federal loans made
available to blacks seeking better homes. In general, however, the
Attorney General attempted to ignore the issue, at least initially. This, in
fact, appeared as the candidate's major campaign strategy; e.g.
,
to take
vague positions on non-controversial issues such as state aid to education,
proposed conflict of interest laws, increased salaries for teachers and law
enforcement officials, and to ignore any controversial issue, i.e.
,
open
occupancy. Clearly the Finan candidacy depended upon support from the
state Democratic organization which was controlled by the incumbent Tawes
Administration. An "extreme" position on a controversial issue was per-
ceived by the Attorney General as potentially damaging to the ability of the
party organization to build support for his candidacy in various local areas
throughout the state.
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Yet it was difficult for Mr. Finan to appear as non-controversial
,
even
given his moderate stand on integrated housing. The liberal Americans
for Democratic Action criticized the candidate for his position and announced
support for Mr. Sickles, while the majority of county Democratic central
committees throughout the Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland expressed
concern as to what the Attorney General's actions on open occupancy would
be, if elected. In one of the candidate's few references to civil rights (and
by implication, open housing)
,
Mr. Finan, before the Polish American Club
in northeast Baltimore, made clear his support for civil rights but stressed
his opposition to civil rights advocates who ignored the law. Later, in the
predominately black 4th district of Baltimore City, the Administration's
candidate emphasized the civil rights accomplishments under the Tawes-
I 7
Finan government.
Upon initial inspection, the strategy of Mr. Finan appeared to be
successful. Indicating the influence and authority of the party organization,
the candidate was able to capture 20 to 30 percent of the black vote in areas
whose population was 90 to 100 percent black; this despite the wide attrac-
tion among blacks tor the liberal Sickles. Perhaps the most significant
indicator of the authority of the Tawes-Hocker organization was Finan's
electoral victory in Lower Eastern Shore Maryland, by all indicators, a
Mahoney stronghold. Despite the Southern, rurally conservative nature of
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this region (comparable with Upper Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland)
,
the Attorney General with his position on open occupancy defeated Mr. Ma-
honey, 39% to 33%. Additional figures indicate, however, that Mr. Mahoney
won in Maryland Upper Eastern Shore by compiling 30% of the vote to Finan's
second place figure of 27%; in Southern Maryland, Mahoney compiled 55%
of the vote compared to 28% for Finan
. The Attorney General carried West-
ern Maryland by a landslide with 64% of the vote and was victorious in
Maryland Piedmont with 36%.
Unlike the electoral support illustrated for ihe candidacy of Mr. Ma-
honey (where support was located primarily in Southern, rurally conserva-
tive Upper Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland or the conservative and
"white backlash" pockets of the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area); and
the Sickles candidacy (whose support was centralized in the Washington,
D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area and among blacks in the Baltimore Metro-
politan region)
,
Mr. Finan's support is not as readily identifiable by
economic grouping. That is, the Attorney General's support is not as
concentrated relative to the other candidates mentioned. Mr. Finan compiled
a majority of votes in Western Maryland, Piedmont Maryland, but also won
the Lower Eastern Shore area. Analysis of economic regions demonstrating
support for the candidate indicates a significant diversity in SES-demo-
araphic characteristics . We maintain that the support rendered for the Finan
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candidacy from these economically differentiated areas was due to the
political authority of the Tawes Administration and the state party organiza-
tion
.
Despite this support, however, Mr. Finan was only able to place third
in the four candidate primary election, receiving 27% of the vote (compared
to 33% for Mahoney and 32% for Sickles)
. It is hypothesized that the saliency
of the open occupancy issue cost the Administration-backed candidate the
election, or at least significantly affected his candidacy in an adverse manner.
Hypothetically, all factors equal, i.e.
,
open housing as a non-issue, the
support of the incumbent Administration, the financial support of the state's
major Democratic contributor, and the perceived moderation of the candidate
on major issues, logically should have produced electoral victory. A single
alternative, again disregarding the question of open occupancy, seems
possible. Given the absence of support for the Administration candidate,
the "throw the rascals out" campaign of Mr. Sickles would seem to be most
attractive to Maryland voters; (given the Tydings victory) . This rationale
appears logical not given a salient issue in the campaign, specifically open
housing. We emphasize once more, however, that the two candidates most
polarized on open occupancy received the majority of votes, as opposed to
Mr. Finan and his position of moderation. Note: The Attorney General's
moderate position on issues did meet with some favor as the Baltimore Sun ,
71
citing the candidate s "good record" in public office, and representation of
"the middle road" editorially endorsed Mr. Finan as the best Democratic
choice. In the final analysis, however, the moderate position assumed by
Mr
. Finan on open occupancy, an issue he wa s compelled to address due to
the affect of the Mahoney candidacy, was a successful strategy for an
incumbent seeking the political benefits of the state party organization.
Given the 1966 Maryland Democratic Primary, however, and the saliency of
integrated housing, the support of the state party organization, whatever
its influence and authority, was not sufficient to produce electoral victory for
the candidate
.
Quantitative analysis indicates that 8% of the variance in the Finan vote
is explained by percent black population (where a negative association exists
between the two variables) ; 6% of the variance in the candidate's vote is
explained by median income level (where a negative relationship also is
apparent)
; 3% of the variance in the Attorney General's vote is explained
by percent blue collar concentration (a positive association is recorded);
10% of the variance in this candidate's support is explained by percent
foreign stock concentration (where a negative r is evident) ; 3% of the
variance is explained by percent white collar (a negative relationship exists)
and 19% of Mr. Finan's vote is explained, by percent vote for Wallace in the
1964 primary (a negative association apparent) . Percent urban, percent
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rural, and median educational level explain 0% of the variance in the Attor-
ney General's vote.
Multiple Regression analysis demonstrates that 19% of the Finan vote
is explained by percent vote for Wallace (Pearson's Correlation also
indicated this)
. Knowledge of an area's foreign stock concentration, given
the Wallace variable, enables an explanatory capacity of 41% (the foreign
stock variable equal to an R Square Change value of .222542) .
We mentioned the affect that the concentration of support in the
Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area had upon the Sickles candi-
dacy (where a substantial foreign stock population was present)
.
Investigation of Mr. Finan 's support indicates a concentration of votes
in Western Maryland (foreign stock population only 3%) , although the candi-
date was victorious in the Lower Eastern Shore, non-native population also
3% compared to 6% statewide. The Attorney General compiled 64% of the vote
in the former-mentioned region and 39% in the latter. Pearson's Correla-
tion statistic indicates a negative relationship between the foreign stock
variable and the vote for Mr. Finan, no doubt reflecting the less than sub-
stantial non-native population of Western Maryland in particular (the candi-
date winning here by an overwhelming margin) . Yet it would be difficult to
state that Mr. Finan was victorious due to an insignificant foreign stock
population (as quantitative analysis of this variable, without further
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investigation would indicate)
. The percent vote for the Wallace candidacy
(this variable represents the greatest R Square Change value)
,
rural
concentration, and median educational level are essential SES
-demographic
elements, that in conjunction with percent foreign stock knowledge, permit
an accurate evaluation of the candidate's vote. Non-quantitative factors,
such as the political abilities of the state political organization and the
candidate's "native son" status in Western Maryland also account for .some
electoral support in this area.
In resuming discussion of Multiple Regression analysis, where the
Finan vote is concerned, knowledge of rural concentration, given the
percent vote for Wallace and percent foreign stock, permits an explanatory
authority of 49% (an increase of 7%); knowledge of median educational level,
given the above variables, allows us to explain 53% of the Finan vote (the
R Square Change value of the variable, median income, equal to .03974 or
approximately 4%) . The variables percent black, percent urban, median
income, and percent white collar, together, equal less than 1% in R Square
Change value. In sum, 53% of the vote for the Attorney General can be
explained
.
Characteris tics Indicative of Support for Finan
a) lower concentration of blacks
b) lower median income level
c) no conclusion based upon median educational level
d) higher concentration of blue collar workers
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e) lower concentration of foreign stock
f) no conclusion based upon percent urban concentration
g) no conclusion based upon percent rural concentration
h) lower white collar concentration
i) lower concentration of the Wallace vote
Significant indicators of the Finan vote, as judged by the R Square
Change statistic: (in rank order)
a) percent vote for Wallace
b) percent foreign stock
c) percent rural concentration
d) median educational level
The moderate position on open occupancy espoused by Mr. Finan,
possibly could have drawn limited support from those uncomfortable with
either of the "extreme" positions of Mr. Sickles or Mr. Mahoney. Yet if
the "middle road" position (as the Sun referred to it)
,
was the campaign
strategy of the candidate, the plan failed to garner enough electoral support.
Mr. Finan, similar to Mr. Sickles, was unable to identify himself with the
major plank of his campaign platform. In other words, Mr. Finan was not
perceived by voters as the sole candidate that offered tax reform or the
lone individual associated with a progressive administration, but as a
candidate in favor of open occupancy with limitations. This latter descrip-
tion may have worked to the candidate's disadvantage, as advocates and
opponents of open housing became unsure or dissatisfied with respect to
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Finan s position; note reaction, aforementioned, by the Americans for Demo-
cratic Action and the various county Democratic central committees in the
Eastern Shore. Both Sickles and Finan appear to have fallen victim to the
Mahoney campaign strategy in which the latter capitalized on a potentially
salient issue by compelling others to take a definite position, after he
(Mahoney)
,
had taken the perceived popular stand. Such a strategy, in
affect, neutralized the significance of the other candidates' platforms.
THE MILES CANDIDACY
The candidacy of lawyer and civic leader Clarence Miles, by all
significant description and evaluation, was rathc-r minimal in affect; the
candidate receiving eight percent of the vote compared to 33% for Mahoney,
32% for Sickles, and 27% for Finan) . Note: Other votes were distributed
among four "also-rans" of the eight individuals in the Democratic primary.
The key plank in the Miles platform was the expressed need to stream-
line government, to end duplication, and thereby save state funds. A chief
means to achieve this objective was to consolidate various state agencies.
On other issues, the candidate cited the need for conflict of interest laws to
be strengthened, an increase in state aid to education, and an increase in
salary for law enforcement officials. In sum, the platform of Mr. Miles was
closely parallel to that of .Attorney General Finan.
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Similar to Finan, Mr. Miles was forced into taking a position on open
occupancy
,
despite attempting to avoid the issue
. Like the Attorney General
Mr
. Miles declared his support for open housing only where commercially
owned homes were concerned. Stated Mr. Miles: "Unconditional open
occupancy is contrary to every American's right, regardless of race, to
occupy and dispose of his home as he sees fit, subject only to zoning and
other laws applicable to all property owners." 19 It became essential for
Miles to disassociate himself from the similarity with the Finan candidacy.
This he attempted to accomplish via a method utilized by Mr. Sickles---by
declaring the Attorney General's association with the corrupt and inefficient
Tawes-Hocker forces. Note that the Tawes Administration, after considerable
outside investigation, had admitted to unethical dealings within the State
Roads Commission. Chief administrators were found guilty of selling land to
the state at inflated prices, after obtaining advanced knowledge of future
valuable properties via state reports .
The Miles campaign strategy was three-fold, dictating the following:
1) address, as the major issue in the campaign, the need to streamline
government and eliminate duplication of services via consolidation of state
agencies (this was also proposed by Mr. Mahoney though, obviously, it was
not treated as the most significant issue in the campaign)
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2) compelled into an open housing opinion similar to that of Mr. Finan,
disassociate himself with similarities of the Finan candidacy by linking the
Attorney General to negative aspects of the Tawes Administration; this,
however, being a strategy utilized by Mr. Sickles, Mr. Miles attached the
Congressman-at-Large on his close association with labor, and his uncondi-
tional pro-open occupancy stand.
Note that Mr. Mahoney's candidacy, though causing Miles to address
the open housing question, was simply dismissed as that which appealed to
20
"racial hatred." Miles was to commit the identical strategic error made by
both Sickles and Finan in all but ignoring the Mahoney candidacy relative
to the opposition presented by the Attorney General and the Congressman
respectively. In support of this evaluation, the Baltimore Sun
,
via coverage
of the candidates and editorial comment, was to suggest that the chief opposi-
tion was between Finan and Sickles. Mr. Miles had likewise admitted this.
3) as Mr. Finan attempted to remain non-controversial with regard to the
salient open occupancy issue and thus benefit from the political activities of
the state party organization, Mr. Miles followed this strategy in hopes of
receiving the support of independent Democratic boss Jack Pollack (whose
might, traditionally, was wielded in Baltimore City's 4th and 5th districts;
note that the term "independent" appears appropriate where Pollack is
concerned since the influencial Democratic fund-raiser had, in the past.
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been known to stray from an incumbent administration's chosen candidate in
the party primary
A reason for Mr. Miles' poor fourth place finish in the primary given
the similarity with Finan on open occupancy (Miles, 8% of the vote, Finan, 27%),
appears able to be explained in a comparison of the political authority of the
Tawes-Hocker state party organization and that of a local political boss whose
powers, indeed had been disintegrating over the years. As the primary
election would indicate (and the subsequent general election)
,
Mr. Pollack's
ability to deliver the vote in Baltimore's two aforementioned districts,
became dampened as the 4th district became predominately black and the
fifth district, Jewish and moderately wealthy. The 4th district, previously
dominated by Pollack's Trenton Democratic Club was to be successfully
challenged by the black Fourth District Democratic Organization; note that
these two organizations would engage in political conflict again in the general
election when blacks refused to support Mahoney. In the primary, however,
as an indicator of Pollack's crumbling ability to deliver the vote, not a
single candidate running for office, opposed by the Fourth District Demo-
cratic Organization, -was elected in that district, despite sanction by Pollack.
A quantitative analysis of the Miles candidacy must be approached with
caution . In six of seven economic areas within the state the candidate placed
last (or tied for last) , in a four candidate race. He received l%of the vote
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in the Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area and Western Maryland
respectively, 2% of the vote in Southern Maryland, 9% in Maryland Piedmont,
10% in the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area, 13% of the vote in the Lower
Eastern Shore and 26% in the Upper Eastern Shore where he placed third.
Quantitative study of Miles' support reflects his status as "favorite-son"
candidate of Queen Anne's County (where he received 56% of the vote)
.
Note that Mr. Miles did not carry, nor did he place second, in any other
county within the Upper Eastern Shore (where Queen Anne's County is
located)
.
Given the above reservation, 6% of the variance in the candidate's
vote is explained by percent black in the area, where a positive association
exists (Queen Anne's County is 25% black, greater than the state mean); 3%
of the variance in the candidate's vote is explained by percent foreign
stock, where a negative relationship is apparent (the county is 5% foreign
stock, less than the state mean) ; 6% of the variance in the Miles vote is
explained by median income, a negative relationship evident (this particu-
lar area has a median income of $8200, less than the average for the state);
16% of the variance in Mr. Miles' vote is explained by median educational
level, a negative r evident (the County's median educational level is 9.5,
less than the state average) ; 12% of the variance is explained by percent
blue collar concentration, where a positive association is found (Queen Anne's
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County is 65% blue collar, greater than the state average)
; 10% of the
variance in the vote lor Miles is explained by percent urban concentration,
where a negative relationship is evident (the county is entirely rural); 6%
of the variance in this vote is explained by percent rural concentration, a
positive r apparent; 12% of the variance is explained by percent white collar
occupations, a negative association evident (the county is 35% white collar,
below the average for the state); and 18% of the variance in the Miles vote
is explained by the percent vote for Wallace, a positive relationship existing
(Wallace received 57% of the Queen Anne's vote in the 1964 presidential
primary, greater than the state mean)
.
Multiple Regression analysis enables us to explain 24% of the Miles
vote given knowledge of the percent vote for Wallace and median educational
level (the latter variable accounting for an R Square Change value of 7%)
;
knowledge of percent foreign stock, given the aforementioned variables
permits explanation of 30% of the candidate's vote (the R Square Change
value of the latter variable equal to 6%) ; percent urban, given other pre-
viously mentioned variables enables explanation of 38% of this candidate's
vote (R Square Change, in this case, equal to 8%); knowledge of percent blue
collar occupations permits us to explain 41% of the Miles vote (R Square
Change equal to 3%); finally, percent black, given the aforementioned
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information, allows an explanatory capacity of 42% with regard to the candi-
date's vote (an R Square Change value equal to 1%) . In sum, we can
explain 42% of Mr. Miles' vote.
Characteristics Indicative of Support for Miles
a) high concentration of black population
b) lower median income
c) lower median educational level
d) high blue collar concentration
e) lower concentration of foreign stock
f) lower percent urban
g) higher percent rural
h) lower percent white collar occupations
i) high percentage of Wallace votes
Significant indicators of the Miles vote, as judged by the R Square
Change statistic: (in rank order)
a) percent vote for Wallace
b) median educational level
c) percent foreign stock
d) percent urban
e) percent blue collar
f) percent black
In final analysis of the Miles candidacy, the lawyer and civic leader
appears to have suffered from his moderate position on the important open
housing question, as did Mr. Finan . Yet the former candidate could not
compile the amount of support garnered for the Attorney General. This, we
maintain, was the result of local political boss, Jack Pollack's inability to
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organize support for Miles as the Tawes Administration's state political
organization was to assist Mr. Finan.
Again, in the Miles case this time, Mr. Mahoney strategically com-
pelled a candidate to assume a position on an issue not considered to be key
in the campaign by the former Democrat; this, we judge simply by Mr. Miles
campaign platform. Mr
. Miles was not identified as the proponent of govern-
ment thrift, but was associated with a moderate open housing stand; thus
having the identical adverse affects upon both proponents and opponents of
open occupancy earlier discussed with respect to the Finan candidacy.
In conclusion to the discussion of the 1966 Maryland Democratic
Primary, it is maintained that electoral preference was based upon the salient
issue of open housing—an issue strategically approached by Mr. Mahoney,
and a strategy we can best describe as politically expedient (a year earlier,
in 1965, Mr. Mahoney had publicly expressed his support for open occupancy)
Three major factors indicate the role played by this issue in determining
candidate selection: (1) the two candidates most polarized on integrated
housing received the majority of votes (2) on other issues cited within our
discussion, close similarity exists among the positions taken by the candi-
dates (3) the victory of the single-issue oriented (anti-open occupancy)
candidate, George Mahoney, illustrates the important nature of the issue in
determining electoral preference.
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Additionally, it seems as though the candidacy of Mr. Finan sub-
stantially lessened the chances of Mr. Sickles. Consideration of two key
characteristics of each candidate's support indicate popularity from areas
distinguished by a lower concentration of blacks and regions that demon-
strated a lower percentage vote for Wallace. Thus the candidates split the
vote among such areas
.
This appears to have been the case in Maryland
Piedmont where Sickles compiled 25% of the vote compared to 36% for Finan
and 25% for Mahoney; and in the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area
where Sickles received 23% of the vote, compared to 23% for Finan and 38%
for Mahoney. We have previously indicated that Finan compiled 20 to 30
percent of the black vote in areas of 90 to 100 percent black population,
this to the disadvantage of Sickles who compiled approximately 70% of such
vote.
It is possible, however, that the candidacy of Mr. Sickles lessened
the chances of Mr. Finan being elected. Given the absence of the Sickles
candidacy, and the alternatives of Mahoney, Finan, and Miles, the electorall.y
significant, liberal Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area, a
significant portion of the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area, organized
labor, the entire black vote, and the support garnered by the state party
organization, would have seemingly resulted in a victory for the Attorney
General
.
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The candidacy of Mr. Miles had two possible affects. Given a similarity
with Mr
. Finan where position on the issue of open occupancy was concerned,
the former candidate may have taken potential votes from the Attorney General
among those who favored a moderate stand on this question; both Richard
Walsh and William Lloyd Fox indicate this in Maryland: A History, 1632-197 4.^
Yet given the marginal support rendered for the Miles candidacy, it would
have been essential for Mr. Finan to have received almost all of the votes
Mr. Miles received to have won the primary. A second possible affect of the
Miles candidacy, judged by our quantitative analysis, is that the candidate
simply prevented Mr. Mahoney from receiving greater support in the
primary due to the former candidate's vote in Queen Anne's County; however,
Mahoney still won the Upper Eastern Shore area by 3% over Mr. Finan.
Note that the characteristics indicative of support for the Mahoney and Miles
candidacies are identical with respect to all SES-demographic variables, yet
the implications of Miles taking votes from Mahoney are minimal, again
given the former candidate's poor showing electorally.
Whether the Mahoney strategy would have been successful in a two
candidate race appears doubtful, given the support registered for candidates
with views on open occupancy different than that of this Democrat. Yet this
is merely speculation and furthermore, is not the topic of our discussion
here. In fact, given a multi-candidate primary, and a potentially salient
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issue, Mr. Mahoney's strategy of capitalizing on these circumstances enabled
him to win the primary with 33% of the vote. However, doubt as to the pos-
sible success of an individual in a two candidate race whose political fortunes
are based entirely on an anti-open occupancy stand, is a relevant concern
with respect to the general election.
Discussion of the Maryland Republican Primary can be quickly dis-
missed. Baltimore County Executive, Spiro Agnew, holding the most
important administrative office of all Republicans in the state, easily re-
OO
ceived his party's nomination with 84% of the vote in a five candidate race.
Running on a platform of tax reform, the candidate's closest rival compiled
8% of the vote
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Primary Election Results
WESTERN MARYLAND Mahoney Sickles Finan Miles Others
18% 17% 64% 1 9-1 O 0%
MARYLAND PIEDMONT Mahoney Sickles Finan Miles Others
25% 25% 36% 9% c.<3.0 o
SOUTHERN MARYLAND Mahoney Sickles Finan Miles Others
55% 13% 28% oo,^ *6 2%
UPPER EASTERN SHORE Mahoney Sickles Finan Miles Others
30% 13% 27% 26% 49o
LOWER EASTERN SHORE Mahoney Sickles Finan Miles Others
33% 12% 39% 13% 3%
BALTIMORE STANDARD Mahoney Sickles Finan Miles Others
METRO. AREA 38% 23% 23% 10% 6%
WASHINGTON STANDARD Mahoney Sickles Finan Miles Others
METRO. AREA 13% 49% 18% 1 9-i 0 19%
Economic Areas by County
WESTERN MARYLAND
Allegany County
Garrett
EASTERN SHORE UPP
.
Cecil County
Caroline
Kent
Queen Anne's
Talbot
MARYLAND PIEDMONT
Car roll County
Frederick
Harford
Howard
Washington
BALTIMORE STANDARD
METROPOLITAN AREA
Baltimore County
Anne Arundel
Baltimore City
SOUTHERN MARYLAND
Calver t County
Charles
St. Mary's
WASHINGTON STANDARD
METROPOLITAN AREA
Prince Georges County
Montgomery
CHAPTER IV
THE GENERAL ELECTION
Initial analysis of the general election indicates that Republican
Spiro Agnew's victory pivoted upon substantial leads in Montgomery County
(37,000)
,
Baltimore City (24,000)
,
and Prince Georges County (14,000) .
He carried all of Western Maryland and Maryland Piedmont (traditional
Republican areas)
,
the Eastern Shore counties of Talbot and Wicomico, and
Harford County, northeast of Baltimore City. The former County Executive
received 455,318 votes compared to 373,543 for the Democrat, Mahoney;
(Agnew compiled 50% of the vote compared to 40% for Mahoney) . The anti-
open housing candidate won eleven counties situated in Eastern Shore and
Southern Maryland, and Anne Arundel and Baltimore Counties, politico-
economic units of the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area. Estimates of
ethnic support gave Agnew over 80% of the black vote, approximately 75%
of the Jewish vote and Mahoney heavy majorities among Italians and Slavs.
Additional study of the Democrat's support reveals that of the sixteen counties
that voted for George Wallace in the 1964 Presidential Primary, Mr. Mahoney
received majorities in twelve (primarily Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland
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counties)
. The Alabama Governor received 57% support from the aforemen-
tioned cluster of counties compared to 53% for Mahoney two years later. State-
wide, Wallace received 44% of the vote contrasted with 40% for the Maryland
Democratic gubernatorial candidate. So that with minimal exception, those
counties attracted to the Wallace candidacy in 1964, cast support for Mahoney
in 1966 with similar fervor. (Jim Lucas, in Agnew: Profile in Conflict
,
reports that the Mahoney candidacy may have suffered to some extent, in
Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland, due to traditional anti-Catholic feeling
in those areas
. )
^
Basically, Mr. Agnew was able to win the election due to previously
mentioned majorities in populous Baltimore City (which contains 52% of the
state's voters) and the traditionally liberal Washington suburbs (Montgomery
and Prince Georges Counties)
,
where 24% of Maryland's registered voters
reside. Mahoney was victorious in thirteen of the state's twenty-three
counties, most of them less populated rural areas with the exception of
Baltimore and Anne Arundel Counties. Eastern Shore and Southern Mary-
land, casting majority support for the Democrat, represent only 11% and 2%
of the state's voting population respectively. Lastly, even though Mahoney
was victorious in populous Anne Arundel and Baltimore Counties, the
candidate's margin of victory in these areas, (6,000 and 13,000 respectively) ,
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was not sufficient to offset Agnew's support in the above-mentioned regions.
Further description of the 1966 Maryland Gubernatorial Election
requires (1) a consideration of the "politics" of the campaign (2) a treat-
ment of county candidate preference patterns. It is suggested that the
governor's race was single issue oriented and that an investigation of
electoral behavior must depend upon a study of candidate policy orientation
toward open housing. Treatment of secondary issues in the campaign is
significant in illustrating the relative similarity between candidates on
policy stance and therefore the increased role assigned to the open occupancy
issue as a determinant of electoral preference.
It can be hypothesized that the political strategy of the Democrat,
George Mahoney, was based upon the popularity of the George Wallace
candidacy in the 1964 Maryland Democratic Presidential Primary where the
Alabama Governor received 44% of the vote. Implied, here, is a positive
association between the appeal for the segregationist policy orientations of
Wallace and the anti-open occupancy position of Mahoney. In fact, major
criticism of the Mahoney candidacy, by the Baltimore City press and
opposition candidate Agnew, centered upon the Democrat's failure to concern
himself with issues other than open occupancy. The Mahoney strategy, then,
involved campaigning on a single issue. The Democrat adopted a position on
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this issue that he perceived capable of attracting votes, based upon the
success of the Wallace candidacy two years earlier.
Specifically, the sentiment expressed by the candidate vis-a-vis open
housing
,
was that such a policy infringed upon the freedom of the home
owner to sell or rent his property to whomever he wanted. Said Mahoney in
a political advertisement that appeared in the Baltimore Sun newspaper: "If
an open housing bill is passed, you can be fined and sent to jail if you
violate the law
.
I am in opposition to any law which takes away the home
owner's right to sell or rent the home in which he lives in any way he
chooses." Earlier, Mahoney had assured potential supporters by declaring
that should he be elected, there would never be open occupancy in Maryland
for he would veto such a measure. Throughout the campaign, Republican
candidate Agnew and a lesser Independent hopeful had seized an opportunity
to attack the Democrat's open housing stand by declaring that the issue was
a federal matter as opposed to a state concern. The rationale here, was that
since possible open occupancy legislation would originate from the national
congress, if at all, talk of the governor's veto power was irrelevant. One
week prior to election day, when confronted with the fact that open occupancy
legislation was a federal concern, on "Eyewitness Newsmakers" (a local
television program)
,
the candidate confessed that he would submit to national
legislation on integrated housing.^ Most significant is the realization of the
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candidate's awareness of the status of the issue throughout the campaign,
yet his continued pledge to veto such legislation as governor.
The campaign for the candidacy of Republican Spiro Agnew, Baltimore
County Executive, stalled during the initial stages due to the candidate's
inability to focus attention away from the issue of open housing
. Agnew 's
self-perceived political attraction rested with his ability to draw attention to
his proposed tax reform measures for the state. The Republican's predica-
ment became apparent when he found it seemingly essential to narrow the
disparity between himself and the Democrat on the open occupancy question.
The County Executive likewise claimed that he would veto any housing legis-
lation affecting the right of the individual home owner to sell his property to
whomever he wished. (A month later Agnew would claim that open occu-
pancy was a federal issue) .
So that Agnew's strategy was to narrow differences between himself and
Mahoney vis-a-vis the position on housing (thus attracting attention to other
issues, particularly tax reform) . However, the pursuit of this strategy
"backfired" on the Republican. By addressing the open housing issue and
attempting to create a similarity between himself and the Democrat, the
issue commanded greater attention and a greater potential vote for Mahoney
due to his position on integrated housing dating back to the primary (Agnew
had not mentioned the question of open occupancy in the Republican primary) .
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Very simply analyzed, in a state that is heavily Democratic, such as Maryland
(Democrats outnumber Republicans 3 to 1)
,
where the two major candidates
are perceived as taking the identical stand
,
the advantage rests with the
Democrat. Later realizing this, Agnew was to revise his open occupancy
stand declaring in late October that should such a bill receive support "by a
majority sentiment and pass in the State Legislature, he v/ould not veto it.^
The last stage of Agnew 1 s policy change toward integrated housing was
a declaration that the issue was a concern to be debated in the national
congress and therefore not a relevant gubernatorial campaign matter. A
key strategy at this point was the initiation of personal attacks upon Mahoney,
questioning the Democrat's competence and knowledge of the state's socio-
economic problems
.
During the initial stages of the gubernatorial campaign, the offensive
was initiated by Mahoney's position on a single issue, the candidate's self-
perceived strength. The Republican, Agnew, was compelled to revise his
strategy several times as a response to the Mahoney initiative. By attempting
to narrow the disparity between himself and the Democrat on the open hous-
ing question, in essence, the County Executive placed himself on the
defensive. Only upon adopting the last of three strategies, i.e.
,
declaring
the issue a federal matter and therefore not a concern for a gubernatorial
race, did the candidate assume a more offensive plan. The significance
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of this offensive-defensive dichotomy has particular implications for the
Agnew candidacy. Key Republican strategists had commented, that because
of the state's Democratic majority, it was essential that Agnew take the
initiative. The Republican's last of three campaign strategies appeared to
reflect the accuracy of this evaluation. Key phrases that appeared in all of
the Republican's speeches throughout the campaign reflect this. Reminding
the electorate of the Democrat's stand on open housing, Agnew referred to
Maryland as a "potential Maddoxville"^ (in reference to Segregationist Lester
Maddox, Governor of Georgia)
,
should Mahoney be elected. Another
familiar phrase of the Republican, signaling his realization of the significance
of Maryland's 3 to 1 Democratic ratio, was that given the Democrat's position
on open occupancy, "this time party loyalty demands too much."^
So that, in summary, Agnew's campaign strategy reflected three, basic
stages
.
1) the first stage where Agnew attempted to narrow policy differences be-
tween himself and the Democrat on the open occupancy issue thus hoping to
create greater public attention upon other issues
2) the second stage where Agnew attempted to present himself as a moderate
on open occupancy, creating a degree of disparity between himself and
Mahoney; the affect of this strategy was to admit the relevancy of the issue,
thus attracting greater attention, still, to the Mahoney candidacy
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3) the third stage where the Republican attempted to place Mahoney on the
defensive (or place himself on the offensive)
,
thereby creating greater public
concern for other issues, in declaring open occupancy a federal question
and not a concern of state politics
Further investigation of the 1966 governor's race indicates that the
Republican's third stage strategy was met with only limited success, i.e.,
electoral preference ultimately was decided based upon a positive or negative
response to Mahoney's open housing position rather than reaction to the tax
reform proposals, or stands taken on other secondary issues by the Republi-
can. Of key significance vis-a-vis the position taken by Agnew on open
housing during the third stage of his strategy, was the perception among the
electorate of a policy alternative relative to Mahoney. So that a negative
reaction to the Democrat's stand on the open occupancy issue is equated with
a positive response to the Agnew candidacy. Noteworthy, is the suggestion
that since an attraction for Agnew may have been dependent upon a negative
response to Mahoney's open housing stand (given the Democratic majority in
the state) at no time did the Republican actually command the initiative or
take the offensive in the campaign.
According to Agnew, the major concern for the State in 1966 (and
therefore the key issue in the election) was the inadequacy of the present
tax structure. Such an evaluation of Maryland's socio-economic status, in
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this regard, was shared by the locally influential Baltimore Sun and Salis-
bury Daily Times newspapers
. The sentiment expressed by the latter
publication, i.e.
,
the major significance of the tax reform issue as opposed
to open housing, is noteworthy in that the Times originates from the rurally
conservative, Southern oriented, Lower Eastern Shore where prime concern
in this election might expect to be over the issue of open occupancy. The
problem in the Maryland tax structure reflected a continuous conflict and
competition between the state and its various local subdivisions vis-a-vis
the ability to collect and distribute such revenues. As of 1966, the local
government's ability to collect taxes was limited to an unpopular property and
earnings tax since the collection of sales and income taxes was pre-empted
by the state. On the average, only one dollar of every four dollars and fifty
7
cents collected by the state was redistributed to the local sub-division. The
problem of such a tax structure is realized in that local areas were chiefly
responsible for maintaining a certain quality and quantity of public services.
Those sectors most frequently mentioned as suffering from the inadequacy
of revenue were public education and safety.
Both candidates agreed that the tax structure needed revamping, yet
the Democrat, Mahoney, in focusing his campaign totally upon an anti-open
housing stand, did not address the former issue in much detail. The revision
in the tax system, advocated by Agnew, entailed an abolishment of the
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unpopular property and earnings tax. In addition, the Republican called
for a more centralized tax system, i.e.
,
the state should assume partial
financial responsibility in maintaining particular local public services, e.g.,
the Baltimore City Police Department and the construction of public school
facilities, particularly in the City. Simultaneously, Agnew proposed that
the state redistribute one of every three dollars collected, back to the local
subdivision. Given the need for additional monies for the upkeep and main-
tenance of the police department in local areas (especially Baltimore City)
,
the City public school system, and an increase in wages for teachers, police,
and state civil servants, the County Executive expressed the belief that
state taxes would necessarily increase by 1968.
The tax revision proposal, in many respects similar to the 1965 Cooper-
Hughes Amendment, met with limited opposition in the wealthier counties due
to a feeling that such counties were "footing the bill" for public services in
Baltimore City. This had also been the concern of the wealthy counties in
1965 when the aforementioned amendment was defeated. The Amendment, in
effect, called for a graduated tax structure. (Our previous assertion that
open occupancy was the key, salient issue in determining candidate prefer-
ence appears additionally valid here given the electoral support for the
Agnew candidacy among the wealthier counties, despite opposition to an
aspect of his tax reform proposal.) Very simply, reaction to Agnew 1 s tax
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reform proposals was not a major criteria for electoral preference. Again,
candidate preference appears, more than not, to have been a function of a
rejection or acceptance of Mahoney's stand on open occupancy.
The Democratic candidate had likewise expressed a desire to abolish
the unpopular property and earnings taxes while simultaneously citing the
need for increases in public services, i.e.
,
improvements in the police
department, increased school construction, increased wages for teachers,
policemen and civil servants, etc. Yet unlike Agnew, Mahoney proposed
a TAX CUT on both the state and local level (this, while services were to be
increased and wages raised)
. "Business-like efficiency" would enable an
increase in services while allowing taxes to be cut, stated Mahoney.® The
Baltimore Sun
,
in response, referred to the Democrat as a "flim-flam artist"
in attempting to present such a policy as a legitimate possibility
.
9
In answer to a position questionnaire submitted to Mahoney by the
League of Women Voters, the candidate suggested public ownership of metro-
politan area transit companies, the development of a rapid transit system,
better equipped police, a police morale program (which included an increase
in wages and a get tough policy with criminals— "to hit first and fire first" as
it was termed) ^ an increase in teachers' pay, teachers' colleges and voca-
tional schools, and an assault upon water pollution. These programs again,
were to be initiated despite an across-the-board tax cut on both the state and
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local level. (The Democrat adhered to an official policy throughout the
campaign, of non-debate with the other candidates (Agnew and a lesser
Independent) ) . In effect, at no time was Mahoney required to publicly defend
the rationality or feasibility of his programs and policies. The candidate
accepted invitations from selected civic organizations where there was a
guarantee that opposition candidates would not appear or were not invited.
In most cases, such civic organizations sought reassurance by the Democrat,
of his pledge against open housing. Often, other issues, such as tax reform
were not discussed. The Democrat's reasoning in not addressing or debat-
ing with the other candidates was that he was not running against any single
individual but "the state of things as they are. The Salisbury Times had
attacked such reasoning by claiming Mahoney's association with the present
Democratic Administration in Annapolis, i.e., he had received the incumbent
governor's endorsement and had benefitted from the Administration's
traditional financial backers (this referred primarily to brewery millionaire,
George Hocker) . The same newspaper had referred to Mahoney's policy of
1 O
non-debate as "insulting to the voters of Maryland
"
i
while the Baltimore Sun
had referred to such behavior as an "indication of the Democrat's ignorance
of the issues and his general incompetence."^ In fact, Mahoney's only
comment on a possible program to facilitate tax reform in Maryland was that,
if elected, he v/ould appoint a blue-ribbon panel to study waste and in-
efficiency in government.
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In answer to a position questionnaire submitted to Agnew by the League
of Women Voters, the candidate suggested a more equitable distribution of
the tax burden among all citizens and an assault, particularly, upon the
fiscal crisis in urban subdivisions, co-ordinated planning in transportation
,
an assault upon water pollution, increases in wages (lav; enforcement
officials, teachers, and civil servants)
,
and improvement in the public
school system, especially school building construction.
Noteworthy is the Republican candidate's emphasis on policies
beneficial to urban areas and programs generally perceived as "liberal,"
e.g.
,
a more equitable distribution of the tax burden, a more centralized
tax structure (more state responsibility for local services—especially in
Baltimore City) . In seeking the urban, liberal vote, the Republican appeared
to have realized his slim chances for gathering massive rural conservative
support (save traditionally Republican Western Maryland) , in great part due
to the stand on open occupancy. (We refer here, specifically, to the rural
conservative vote in Southern, Upper and Lower Eastern Shore Maryland
respectively.) The Baltimore Sun had reported Agnew as publicly admitting
he would lose the entire conservative vote and a significant number of the
rural vote (later quantitative analysis confirms this) , but had hoped to
compensate for this by capturing the liberal and urban vote within the Demo-
cratic party . 14 (In essence, the Republican hoped to gain the support
100
garnered by the two major Democratic candidates who lost to Mahoney in the
primary (Carlton Sickles and Thomas Finan) ) . Both of these candidates
had received overwhelming liberal, urban and black support. Sickles and
Finan together accounted for 59% of the Democratic vote.
In evaluating the two candidates' positions on open housing and on
"secondary issues" (issues other than integrated housing)
,
particularly
tax reform, we suggest that electoral behavior most likely was based upon an
acceptance or rejection of the Democrat's anti-open housing stand. Given
the Republican's third stage strategy, a policy alternative on this issue was
perceived. Where the issue of tax reform was concerned, there appeared
less of a policy alternative, i.e.
,
both candidates proposed to abolish the
unpopular earnings and property taxes. Indeed, the chief concern over the
issue of tax reform, vis-a-vis voter response, appeared to be a question of
the Democrat's credibility in proposing a tax reduction while simultaneously
citing goals for programs which obviously would demand increased funding.
(We previously cited the Salisbury Times where key consideration was given
to Mahoney's failure to debate with other candidates (especially on the issue
of tax reform)
,
and the Baltimore Sun which referred to the Democrat's
questionable credibility vis-a-vis the feasibility of his tax proposals.) This
appears to indicate a basis for candidate preference on grounds other than
open occupancy. However, as later quantitative analysis will indicate,
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Mahoney was victorious in these areas in which the aforementioned publica-
tions are located
.
Additional similarity among each candidate on secondary issues is
apparent in evaluating their positions as cited via the previously mentioned
League of Women Voters questionnaire.
Given an introduction as to the policy orientations of the two candi-
dates on open occupancy and other secondary issues, we now want to
approach a discussion of "the Mahoney vote" and "the Agnew vote." This
effort requires a two-step procedure: (1) a discussion of each candidate's
organized, political support (2) a quantitative analysis of county candidate
preference. Our specific purpose is to study the relationship between such
preferences and selected socio-economic variables in order to determine
characteristics of counties common to support for Agnew and the same with
respect to Mahoney
. Selected variables include: percent black, percent
foreign stock, percent urban, percent rural, median income and education,
percent blue collar and white collar, and percent vote for Wallace in the 1964
Democratic Presidential Primary in Maryland. In order to facilitate such a
study, the state has been geographically sub-grouped into economic regions
as suggested by Bogue and Beale in Economic Areas of the United States .^
A discussion of candidate organizational support must be approached
with a major limitation in mind. Knowledge of such support does not
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necessarily indicate a pattern of county political preference or behavior to
be suspected. In other words, to state that the Baltimore Sun supported
the Agnew candidacy does not indicate, necessarily, that Baltimore City or
the Baltimore Metropolitan Area supported the Republican. Note that, in
fact, the Baltimore Metropolitan Area voted for Mahoney. An analysis of
socio-economic characteristics, by county or economic region, appears
more dependable in citing suspected candidate preference.
However, while a discussion of candidate organizational support at
best represents an unreliable indication of ultimate electoral preference, such
an undertaking satisfactorily serves as an introduction to possible political
orientations and electoral patterns prior to SES analysis (our opening re-
marks on candidate campaign strategies and issues served this same
purpose)
.
If, as we already stated, the Agnew campaign strategy was to seek the
favor of Democratic liberals, judging by the candidate's organizational
support, such a strategy appeared successful. Both the Baltimore City
branch of the Committee on Political Education (the political arm of the
AFL-CIO)
,
and the urban based Americans for Democratic Action (who
supported 85% of the state's Democratic candidates in 1966) , indicated official
support for the Republican.
16
In fact, the ADA had adopted a "get tough"
policy with those many local, Democratic candidates it was supporting (some
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receiving financial assistance)
,
claiming an immediate denunciation by the
organization, of any candidate that sanctioned or demonstrated support
for the Mahoney candidacy
. Dominic Fornano, head of the local branch of
the AFL-CIO, in addressing union members at a "Citizens for Agnew" rally,
had lauded the pro-labor record of the Republican as Baltimore County Execu-
17
tive. (The organizational support of the AFL-CIO and COPE in particular
had limited affect upon the electoral behavior of labor.) That labor voted
overwhelmingly for Mahoney is illustrated in our quantitative analysis. This
supports our assertion that organizational support does not necessarily
indicate a pattern of county or area candidate preference.
Other support for the Agnew candidacy originated from the Baltimore
Sun
,
citing the Republican's "proven administrative ability" and "knowledge
of the state's social and economic problems," while denouncing the Mahoney
candidacy as a "racist campaign" and an "appeal to prejudice and bigotry-" 1 ®
In addition, the Baltimore County Executive had compiled unified support
from the City's black population, where this group accounted for 35% of the
registered vote . Agnew was to receive an incredible 90% of the black vote in
Baltimore City compared to 40% for the Republican gubernatorial candidate
in 1962; a majority of this vote originating from the predominately black 4th
District. 19 Throughout the campaign, Agnew had cpenly received the support
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of Baltimore's two most influential black politicians, State Senators Clarence
Mitchell and Verda Welcome.*^
In addition to the support generated in the City's predominately black
4th District, Agnew gathered further votes in the "silk stocking," liberal
5th District. Republican support in these two districts is especially signifi-
cant given the traditional stronghold in these areas by Democratic political
boss Jack Pollack. Of interest in the 1966 election is the political conflict
between Pollack's established Trenton Democratic Club, comprised of "old
guard" party workers dating back to immediate post World War II, and the
newly formed, predominately black Fourth District Democratic Organization.
The ability of the Republican to garner support from the Fourth and Fifth
Districts, then, seemed to indicate the beginning of the end of the Pollack
organization's control over the area. (As a sidenote, perhaps further
indicating the breakdown of the Pollack machine, State Senator Clarence
Mitchell (backed by the Fourth District Democratic Organization) easily
defeated his Pollack supported opponent.
In addition to seeking the traditional liberal Democratic and black
votes, Agnew attempted to remain in favor with Maryland's only tw’o Republi-
can counties (Allegany and Garrett Counties) . Open occupancy appears not
to have been as salient of an issue here, relative to ether areas in the state
(later quantitative analysis seems to imply this) . Surprisingly enough, the
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Cumberland Morning News
,
in stating that both candidates advocated the
identical open housing stand, cited the Democrat Mahoney as the preferred
choice due to his "proven business expertise" (Mahoney's construction
O 1
business enabled him to become a millionaire)
. It was thought that the
Democrat's abilities would best assure a positive business climate as opposed
to the administrative expertise of Agnew. Noteworthy is the Beale and Bogue
description of Allegany and Garrett Counties where economic recessions in
the state are first to affect this area. (Again, however, candidate preference
in this Western Maryland area appears not to have been a function of a
choice based upon secondary issues (in this case, "business expertise"
versus "administrative expertise")
,
as judged by the ultimate electoral
support for Agnew.) We suggest that such support was based upon a nega-
tive response to the Mahoney candidacy (in an area where open occupancy
was not a relevant issue due, in part, to an insignificant number of blacks) ,
and the Democrat's failure to address other issues in depth relative to the
Republican
.
Definitely surprising was the support rendered to the Agnew candidacy
by the Salisbury Daily Times , which we mentioned originates from the rurally
conservative lower Eastern Shore portion of Maryland. Note that George
Wallace received approximately 68% of the vote in 1964 in this area. The
newspaper cited, in a "Voter's Right to Know" editorial, "the Democrat's
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insulting behavior in refusing to debate the issues with the other candidates
and his failure to accept numerous invitations by civic groups to discuss
issues." In addition, the publication attacked Mahoney's association with
the "Tawes-Hocker Regime" (as previously stated, the Democrat rationalized
his policy of non-debate with other candidates in that he was "running against
the state of things as they are") , 22 Ironically, Mahoney had attacked opposi-
tion candidate Thomas Finan in the Democratic primary as being delinquent
in his duties and associated with a corrupt government (Finan was the Attor-
ney General under the Tawes Administration)
. Nov/ that the campaigning for
the general election had begun, Mahoney had graciously accepted the support
of the Tawes regime. So that in retrospect, the Salisbury newspaper's
support for Agnew appeared as a function of dissatisfaction with the Mahoney
candidacy as opposed to satisfaction wiih the Republican's open housing
stand. However, it is again important to realize that organizational support
(in this case support from the press)
,
does not especially indicate a pattern
of county electoral behavior. Note that quantitative analysis and voter
election returns demonstrate overwhelming support for Mahoney in this
Eastern Shore region.
In analyzing the support behind the Mahoney candidacy , it is essential
to briefly discuss the proceedings of the State Democratic Convention in
1966. It is accurate to state that the Democratic candidate represented a
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divided party (he received 33% of the vote in the primary)
,
due mostly to
conflicts among party members as to what official position Democrats should
adopt on the open occupancy issue. In fact, the above prospect had been
the concern of many Democrats during the primary, given the significant
negative response to Mahoney's "Your Home is Your Castle--Protect It" theme
indicative of his anti-open housing stand. Both of Maryland's Democratic
U.S. Senators, Joseph Tydings and Daniel Brewster, refused to publicly
endorse Mahoney at any time. In addition, chief Democratic rival in the
past primary, Carlton Sickles, publicly denounced the Mahoney candidacy
as "racist" just prior to the Convention, as did lesser Democratic rival
Clarence Miles The other major opposition to Mahoney in the Democratic
Primary, Attorney General Thomas Finan, ultimately supported the
Democratic representative after he succumbed to the pressure of Governor
Tawes' "party loyalty politics." (Curiously enough, the former Attorney
General later received a state judgeship—weeks prior to the general election) .
Significant, however, is the lack of support apparent within the Maryland
Democratic Party for the Mahoney candidacy
.
Mahoney's response in attempting to confront this problem of disunity
was to "pack" key Convention committees, the platform committee in parti cu
lar, with advocates of his anti-open occupancy stand. Realizing the pursuit
of such a strategy in advance, the response of the out-numbered, liberal
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element (out-numbered vis-a-vis positions held in key committees)
,
was to
boycott the Convention. Nevertheless, a "rubber stamp" vote was taken at
the Convention on whether to officially adopt the slogan "Your Home is Your
Castle-Protect It" (along with the implications of the slogan)
. By a 138-45
margin, the slogan was adopted as the official policy on open occupancy in
Maryland by the State Democratic Party. Chief dissent, among those who
were present at the gathering, originated from Baltimore City's 4th and 5th
Districts and the wealthy, liberal, Washington D.C. suburban counties of
the state.
The overall affect of these events at the Convention was Mahoney's
reliance upon "old guard" Democrats to build a coalition of popular and
organizational support. Such Democrats included the aforementioned Jack
Pollack, political boss in Baltimore City, Emerson Harrington Jr., aged 72,
an unofficial Democratic organizer in Eastern Shore Dorchester County
(whose father, in the typical Eastern Shore Maryland aristocratic style, was
once governor of the state) ; Wilbur Dulin , former state senator from the
Baltimore Metropolitan Area's Anne Arundel County, who had been politically
inactive since 1956; Philip Dorsey, Jr.
,
who was presently a circuit judge
in Southern Maryland and whose son was running for state senator , and
• 24
George Hocker, brewery monopolist and perennial Democratic fund raiser
.
It was most likely the activities of these individuals that assisted in the
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creation of a favorable image of the Mahoney candidacy as expressed by the
Annapolis Evening Capital newspaper. The publication, originating from
Anne Arundel County, described the Democrat as "a protector of the little
man against growing federal intervention in states' and individual rights." 25
(Interestingly enough, the George Wallace candidacy in 1964 had been
described in a like manner.) The Capital
,
in declaring its support for the
Democrat, stated that while Agnew's administrative experience made him a
more acceptable candidate to the entire state, the Mahoney position on open
occupancy was more acceptable to Anne Arundel County voters
.
Note the
emphasis attributed to the issue of open occupancy (later electoral analysis
indicates that Anne Arundel County indeed voted for Mahoney) .
It seems apparent, in discussing the Mahoney candidacy, originating
with the conflict in the Convention and given the comments of the Evening
Capital, that open housing was possibly the single most salient issue in the
1966 gubernatorial election. Typically enough, the Democrat received the
unsolicited yet accepted support of the Maryland branch of the National States'
Rights Party and the Interstate Ku Klux Klan
.
In consideration of the Mahoney candidacy as single issue oriented
toward open housing, the Baltimore Su n predicted widespread appeal for the
Democrat in the rural, conservative areas of Southern and Eastern Shore
27
Maryland, with the Baltimore Metropolitan Area considered a "toss up."
no
The Republican, Agnew, was predicted support in traditionally
Republican Western Maryland, Piedmont Maryland, where open occupancy
was not seen as a major issue relative to other regions in the state, the
Washington D.C. suburban counties, the "heart" of Maryland liberalism, with
the Baltimore Metropolitan Area considered as a struggle.
^
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Predicted Areas of Support for Agnew “
a) Western Maryland
b) Washington D .C . suburban area
c) Piedmont Maryland
d) possibility of the Baltimore Metropolitan Area
ABOVE REGIONS' PERCENT OF STATE'S VOTING POPULATION 90%
EXCLUSIVE OF BALTIMORE METROPOLITAN AREA 38%
Predicted Areas of Support for Mahoney^
a) Lower Eastern Shore Maryland
b) Upper Eastern Shore Maryland
c) Southern Maryland
d) possibility of the Baltimore Metropolitan Area
ABOVE REGIONS' PERCENT OF STATE'S VOTING POPULATION 63%
EXCLUSIVE OF BALTIMORE METROPOLITAN AREA 11%
A quantitative analysis of selected demographic and socio-economic
variables will allow an accurate definition of the composition of "the Mahoney
vote" and "the Agnew vote." In order to facilitate such an undertaking, we
propose to utilize Pearson's Correlation and Multiple Regression statistics.
As previously mentioned, selected variables include: (a) percent vote for
Ill
Wallace (b) percent black (c) median income (d) median educational level
(e) percent blue collar (f) percent foreign stock (g) percent urban (h) per-
cent rural (i) percent white collar
In the analysis of county candidate preference (sub-grouped into seven
economic areas)
,
we discover most significant rates of correlation between
percent vote for Wallace and preference for Mahoney (a Pearson's r of .7626);
secondly, a negative correlation of .4014 between percent urban and vote
registered for the Democrat; thirdly, a negative correlation of .3862 between
percent foreign stock and vote for Mahoney; a negative association of .3092
between median income and vote for the candidate; a negative association
between median educational level and the 1966 Democratic vote of .3069; a
. 2976 relationship between percent black and support for the Mahoney can-
didacy; a positive .1632 relationship between the Mahoney vote and percent
blue collar; and a negative .1632 association between percent white collar
and the Democratic vote.
Such statistics indicate that 58% of the variance in the Mahoney vote
"is explained" by the vote for Wallace in the 1964 Democratic Presidential
Primary. Note that such evaluations are "county-by-county" and "region-by-
region," i.e.
,
all data are aggregate in nature. Sixteen percent of the
variance in the Mahoney vote is explained by percent urban (yet a negative
r exists here, i.e.
,
the greater urban the area, the less vote for the
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Democrat)
; 14% of the variance in this vote is explained by percent foreign
stock (again, a negative relationship exists thus having the identical affect
as the "urban" variable in its relationship with the Mahoney vote); 9% of the
variance is explained by percent rural (since a positive r exists here, the
greater the rural nature of the county or region, the greater the support
for the Democrat; 9% of the variance in the Mahoney vote is explained by
educational level and median income level respectively (a negative r is
present) . In addition, 8% of the variance is explained by percent black
population. Note that due to the prominence of the open occupancy issue, a
positive relationship between percent black and the vote for Mahoney
possibly reflects favorable reaction by white voters to the Democrat's anti-
open housing stand in those regions having a significant black population
.
It does not, then, indicate black support for the Democrat. Two percent of
the variance in the Mahoney vote is explained by percent blue collar; 2% of
the variance in this particular electoral preference is explained by percent
white collar (though a negative r exists, i.e.
,
the greater the percentage
of white collar workers in a region or county, the less the vote for the
Democrat) .
So that the following characterization of the support for Mahoney
appears accurate, vis-a-vis county candidate preference. The Democratic
candidate received support in those counties that (in ranking order via
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significance of Pearson's r)
,
demonstrated a support for the Wallace can-
didacy in 1964, had minute percentages of foreign stock within their
boundaries, were characterized by lower levels of income and education, had
larger proportions of a black population, and were oriented toward blue
collar occupations.
In order to further address the concern of the Mahoney vote, we utilize
as noted, a Multiple Regression analysis. By analyzing both the association
between a given SES variable and the Mahoney vote, and the explanatory
capacity of given variables, a more complete evaluation of county candidate
preference factors in the 1966 Democratic vote is presented.
Regression analysis indicates that 58% of the Mahoney vote, by county,
can be explained by the Wallace vote, i.e.
,
those counties that indicated
significant support for Wallace in 1964, illustrated support for Mahoney in
1966. Sixty-three percent of the Democratic vote in 1966 can be explained
from knowledge of both the Wallace vote and percent black in given counties
(percent black accounts for an increase in explanatory capacity of 5%) . The
percent Wallace vote, percent black, and percent foreign stock account for
an increase to 65% in explanatory capacity (percent foreign stock accounting
for the increase of 2%) . A consideration of the Wallace vote, percent black,
percent foreign stock, and percent white collar enables our explanatory
ability to increase to 73% concerning the Mahoney vote (the variable "white
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collar occupation" increases the ability to explain the Democratic vote by 8%) .
The addition of the variable, "median educational level," given our above
stated variables, explains 74% of the Mahoney vote (this latter variable
increases the rate of explanation by 1%) . (Rate of explanatory change as we
utilize the phrase, is referred to statistically as "R Square Change.") The
addition of percent rural accounts for an R Square Change of less than 1%
(therefore the explanation level for the Mahoney vote remains approximately
74%. Given our previously stated variables in this analysis, percent urban
accounts for an R Square Change of 1% and a total explanatory capacity of
75%. The last variable, median income, increases one's ability to explain the
Mahoney vote by less than 1% (an R Square Change of .00027) . In total, then,
75% of the Mahoney vote can be explained given our selected variables in
quantitative analysis . So that in attempting to account for the Democratic
vote in 1966, judging by the statistic R Square Change, five, key explanative
variables are (1) percent vote for Wallace (2) percent white collar (3) per-
cent black (4) percent foreign stock (5) median educational level.
In order to analyze, what may be termed "the Agnew vote," the identi-
cal statistical technique is utilized. Thirty-six percent of the variance in
the Republican vote is explained by median educational level; 31% of the
variance in this particular vote is explained by the percent vote for Wallace
(where a negative r exists) , indicating the greater the support for
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Wallace among certain counties in 1964, the less support for Agnew in these
same counties in 1966. Twenty-seven percent of the variance in the
Republican's vote is explained by the percent foreign stock; 19% of such
variance is explained by percent white collar, 19% of the variance in the
GOP vote is explained by percent blue collar (a negative r exists in this
latter case) . Eighteen percent of the variance in the Agnew vote is accounted
for by the percent black in a given county (again, a negative r is recorded)
.
(In analyzing this particular relationship, as we stated in the discussion of
the Mahoney vote, a significant percentage of blacks in a given area is cause
for favorable white reaction to Mahoney's anti-open occupancy policy.) Like-
wise, the less the percentage of blacks, e.g.
,
Republican Western Maryland
(.06% black)
,
the less favorable or less relevant the Democrat's position on
this issue tends to be.
The degree to which a given county is rural, or urban each accounts
for 17% of the variance in the Agnew vote, with the former variable expressed
in terms of a negative r . So that the Agnew vote is comprised of support in
the urban areas; characterized further by higher income and higher educa-
tional level regions; such regions have high concentrations of foreign stock,
are less populated by blacks, and are dominated by white collar occupations.
In addition, the counties supporting the Agnew candidacy in 1966 tended
not to support Wallace in 1964.
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Analyzing the Agnew vote in terms of Regression analysis, we discover
that 36% of the Republican's vote can be explained by knowledge of median
educational level. With additional consideration of the percent vote for
Wallace, the explanatory capacity of our analysis extends to 49% (an R
Square Change of 12% is attributed to the Wallace vote)
. Given the above
variables "median education" and "percent vote for Wallace," percent blue
collar enables us to account for 50% of the Republican's vote)
. Percent
foreign stock accounts for an R Square Change of 4%, enabling an ability to
account for 54% of the vote for this candidate. Percent rural dees not signifi-
cantly increase the explanatory capacity of the analysis (R Square Change is
equal to .00523); so that, still, 54% of the vote is explained . Percent urban
,
however, enables us to account for 57% of the Agnew vote (an R Square Change
of 3%) , while the addition of the variable, median income, represents an R
Square Change of 1% (i.e., 58% of the GOP candidate's support) can now be
explained. The addition of "percent black" accounts for an R Square Change
of only .00119 and therefore does not significantly increase our ability to
explain support for the Agnew candidacy. Our conclusion, here., is that given
a knowledge of county or regional demographic and SES characteristics, via
quantitative analysis, we can accurately suspect particular county electoral
behavior patterns. Such an analysis permits us, in addition, to explain
58% of the vote for Agnew (75% of the vote for Mahoney) .
In sum, key explanatory variables vis-a-vis classification of "the
Mahoney vote" and "the Agnew vote" appear, in rank order, as follows:
Note that significance of variables in explaining candidate preference (i.e.,
the "rank order" we have assigned to such variables) is a function of R
Square value
.
Common Characteristics of Counties (Statewide)
Supportive of the Mahoney Candidacy
1) high concentration of the Wallace vote in the 1964 Democratic primary
2) low percentage of white collar occupations
3) high concentration of black population
4) low concentration of foreign stock
5) lower median educational levels
Common Characteristics of Counties (Statewide)
Supportive of the Agnew Candidacy
1) higher median educational level
2) lower concentration of the Wallace vote
3) higher concentration of foreign stock
4) higher percent urban
5) lower percent blue collar
In order to increase the accuracy of our study (which suggests that
counties indicating an electoral preference for a particular candidate are
characterized by certain demographic, socio-economic conditions) , we pro-
pose an investigation of county candidate preference by "economic areas" as
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suggested by Bogue and Beale in Economic Areas of the United States . 31
According to this technique, the state is sub-grouped into a consideration of
Western Maryland, Maryland Piedmont, Lower and Upper Eastern Shore
respectively, the Baltimore Metropolitan Area, Southern Maryland, and the
Washington, D.C. suburban area.
Investigation of Western Maryland (Allegany and Garrett Counties)
indicates that this region supported Agnew by 52% compared to 37% for
Mahoney. Given this electoral preference, key county characteristics
common to our definition of the support for Agnew ought to be prevalent in
this area. (In analyzing socio-economic characteristics of a given area,
i.e.
,
the classification of a region as a "blue collar area," "urbanized area,"
etc
. ,
the mean average of such factors on the state level is utilized as a basis
for comparison
.
ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES (Western Maryland)
This region voted 10% for the Wallace candidacy in 1964 compared to
a state figure of 44% support for the Alabama Governor. Thus the lower con-
centration of the Wallace vote appears as a factor in determining what we
would expect to be an electoral preference for Agnew given the statewide
county analysis. Yet other characteristics common to the state, indicating a
support for Agnew are not common to Western Maryland, i.e.
,
the region
contains a high percentage of blue collar workers (63% compared to a state
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level of 56%)
,
has lower concentrations of foreign stock (3% compared to 6% for
the state)
,
has a slightly lower median educational level (10.4 contrasted to
11 yrs
.
for the state as a whole)
,
and is considerably rural (73% compared to
60% for the state)
. These are regional characteristics that at initial glance,
indicate a preference for the Democrat Mahoney rather than Agnew. Yet given
the fact that this area demonstrated candidate choice for the Republican, the
variable "percent vote for Wallace" must be singled out for its increased
significance in accounting for such electoral behavior. In addition to a con-
sideration of factors that contribute to the support of the Republican nominee,
some recognition of the absence of key SES characteristics typical of the
support for Mahoney may be relevant in explaining why Western Maryland
voted for Agnew. Very simply, then, candidate preference can be analyzed
via a study of key demographic, SES factors that are present within a given
region (thus indicating
,
in the case of Western Maryland , the low concentra-
tion of the Wallace vote) , as well as key factors absen t that indicate possible
lack of support. For example, the percent vote for Wallace was discovered
as the only key variable valid in suggesting support for Agnew. Yet a key
SES factor indicating support for the Mahoney candidacy is a significant
number of blacks . This particular region contains a black population of less
than 1% compared to the state mean of 18%--hence a factor indicative of Repub-
lican support and lack of support for the Mahoney candidacy. This appears
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important in analyzing Agnew's victory over Mahoney in Western Maryland.
Investigation of the Baltimore Metropolitan Area (Anne Arundel and
Baltimore Counties and Baltimore City) indicates that this region supported
Mahoney by 45% and Agnew 42% (an Independent received the majority of
other votes)
. Given this electoral preference, key area characteristics
common to our definition of the Mahoney support ought to be prevalent.
ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES (Baltimore Metropolitan Area)
Analysis of this particular region is rather difficult. Common SES
factors are (a) a moderate median educational level--constant with the state
(b) a high concentration of foreign stock— 11% compared to 6% for the state
(c) a high degree of urbanization--85% compared to 36% (d) a lower percentage
of blue collar occupations— 47% contrasted to 56%
The presence of these factors indicate a suspicion of support for the Agnew
candidacy, yet the region voted for Mahoney. Two variables, it appears,
account substantially for the political behavior in this area; the percent vote
for Wallace and the percent black population. A high concentration of the
black population, we stated in analyzing county electoral behavior, is one
cause generating support, for the Mahoney candidacy. An investigation of the
concentration of blacks in this region indicates that the Baltimore Metropolitan
Area is 22% black compared with a rate cf 18% for the entire state In addition,
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we find that 42% of this region voted for Wallace (a rate fairly constant with
the state level of 44%) .
In order to further analyze this region, we must segregate Baltimore
City from its two satellite counties. While the Baltimore Metropolitan Area
supported Mahoney, the City did not (Agnew 47%, Mahoney 37%--again the
majority of other votes to an Independent)
. So that a study of the Mahoney
vote is facilitated given a consideration of only Baltimore and Anne Arundel
Counties. With this restriction, we discover a 48% rate of support for the
Wallace candidacy in 1964 (compared to 44% for the state)
,
indicating a sus-
picion of attraction for the Democrat Mahoney. This variable appears as the
only reliable indicator of candidate choice in this region. Excluding
Baltimore City, the median income and educational levels, percent white
collar are all inflated while percent black, percent blue collar are deflated
(yet excluding the City, this region voted for Mahoney by 48%) .
Consideration of Baltimore City indicates the following characteristics:
a high percentage black population (50%) , a lower median educational level
(9.9 yrs.) , a lower percentage of white collar occupations (45%) . (All
above figures are relative to the Baltimore Metropolitan Area, i.e.
,
we are
comparing Baltimore City with Baltimore and Anne Arundel Counties) . In
addressing characteristics of the City, initial observation suggests an
electoral preference for Mahoney. However, a consideration of urban con-
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centration --a factor indicating support for Agnew— (100% compared to 78%
for the region as a whole)
,
percent vote for Wallace (31% for the City, 42%
for the region) appears to significantly account for the support demonstrated
for the Agnew candidacy. Additionally, the presence of a significant black
population appears to have two possible affects. As indicated previously, a
substantial black populace may serve to attract favorable reaction to
Mahoney's anti-open housing stand where whites are concerned. In other
words, open occupancy is very much a salient or relevant issue. This analysis
appears accurate, however, only where there is a significant black population,
but not where blacks approach a majority, e.g.
,
Baltimore City. In the latter
case, a concentration of blacks, in negative response to Mahoney's anti-open
housing position, demonstrated support for the Republican increasing the
latter's chances for electoral victory.
In Baltimore City, then, the black vote assisted in off-setting the vote
of those whites attracted by the Democrat's stand on integrated housing. (The
presence of the "white liberal" vote, particularly in Baltimore's often-men-
tioned 5th District can be said to have had a similar affect on the Mahoney vote.
ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES (Piedmont Maryland)
Investigation of Piedmont Maryland (Carroll, Frederick, Harford,
Howard
,
and Washington Counties) , indicates that this region voted for Agnew
by 50% compared to 43% for Mahoney. Given this preference, key area
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characteristics common to our description of the Agnew vote ought to be out-
standing. However, in order to accurately analyze this region, a technique
earlier referred to must be utilized, i.e.
,
candidate preference in Piedmont
Maryland must be studied via the absence of key SES factors whose presence
would indicate probable support for Mahoney. Naturally, reference to the
existence of SES characteristics in this region whose presence is indicative
of support for Agnew is likewise essential.
Piedmont Maryland's median educational level is identical to that of
the state as is its concentration of foreign stock. The region has an urban
concentration of 34% (compared to 36% for the state) and a similar percent of
blue colair occupations relative to the entire state. Such characteristics of
the region do not compare favorably (that is to say such characteristics are
not similar)
,
with those cited as common to the Agnew vote statewide, i.e.
,
higher median educational level (relative to the state)
,
higher concentration
of foreign stock, higher percent urban, lower percent rural, lower percent
blue collar, (all figures relative to the state)
. In fact, the above SES factors
do not permit an accurate evaluation of probable electoral behavior, in part
due to the significant degree of similarity between this region and the state.
In retrospect, a correct assumption might suggest that Piedmont Maryland's
electoral behavior reflects that of the state in general, given identical SES
characteristics. Yet we remain concerned in attempting to account for this
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region's preference for Agnew. Additional investigation reveals that Pied-
mont Maryland voted for the candidacy of George Wallace by 32% (compared
with 44% for the state)
,
a factor which indicates probable preference for the
Republican candidate. Further analysis illustrates that candidate preference
in this area may be accounted for by the absence of at least one, major
characteristic found to be common in areas demonstrating a support for
Mahoney—the presence of a significant black population. Piedmont Maryland
is but 5% black compared to 18% for the entire state. So that in addressing a
single, yet important characteristic of areas supportive of the Agnew can-
didacy (a low concentration of the vote for Wallace) and a major factor
indicative of support for Mahoney (a significant black population—which
Maryland Piedmont lacks)
,
we have accounted for two probable factors
responsible for electoral behavior and the subsequent support of Spiro Agnew
in this region
.
ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES (Southern Maryland)
Investigation of Southern Maryland (Calvert, Charles, and St. Mary's
Counties)
,
indicates that the region voted for Mahoney by 57% compared to
41% for Agnew. An analysis of this area is not difficult as electoral behavior
can be accounted for via the aforementioned, key SES characteristics common
to the Mahoney vote in our statewide consideration. Southern Maryland is
characterized by a high percent vote for Wallace in 1964 (53% compared to
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44% for the state)
,
a high percent black population (29% compared to 18%)
,
a
low concentration of foreign stock (5% compared to 6%)
,
and a median educa-
tional level identical to that of the entire state.
Each of these characteristics, save the latter variable where no analysis
is possible, are elements common to areas supportive of the Mahoney can-
didacy. From an alternative perspective, an investigation of Southern
Maryland reveals the absence of those factors indicative of support for the
Republican, Agnew, i.e.
,
higher median educational level, low concentra-
tion of the Wallace vote, high concentration of foreign stock, and significant
urban concentration (Southern Maryland is 88% rural)
.
ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES (Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area)
Investigation of the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area (units within
Maryland include Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties)
,
indicates that
63% of this region voted for Agnew compared to 33% for Mahoney. This area
is distinguished by a higher median educational level (14 yrs. contrasted
with 11 yrs. for the state as a whole) , a lower concentration of the Wallace
vote (29% compared to 44%) , a higher concentration of foreign stock (17%
contrasted to 6%) , a high degree of urbanization (91% compared to 36%) , and
a lower rate of blue collar occupations (28% contrasted to 56%) .
In addition, we would suspect support for the Agnew candidacy in this
region due to the absence of SES and demographic factors common to areas
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supportive of the Mahoney candidacy, i.e.
,
a significant Wallace vote, low
concentration of foreign stock, significant black population (the region’s
black population is 13% compared to 18% for the state)
,
etc. (Reference to
these SES characteristics found to be common of areas supportive of the
Mahoney candidacy on a statewide level may prove useful.) Where the
Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area is concerned, such factors indicative of
support for the Democrat, will be found to be absent.
ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES (Upper Eastern Shore Maryland)
Investigation of Upper Eastern Shore Maryland (Caroline, Cecil, Queen
Anne's, Kent, and Talbot Counties)
,
indicates that the region voted for
Mahoney by 51% compared to 45% for Agnew . The area voted 53% for George
Wallace in 1964 (compared with the frequently mentioned state figure of 44%)
,
contains a black population of 21% (18% for the state)
,
has a median income of
$8000 (compared with $9400 for the state) , a median educational level of 10
yrs. (11 yrs . for the state) , is 66% blue collar (56% for the state) and 5%
foreign stock populated (contrasted with 6% for the state) , and 70% rural
(compared with a figure of 60% for the state) . These characteristics corres-
pond to those previously mentioned as indicators of the Mahoney vote, i.e.
,
a high concentration of the Wallace vote, low concentration of foreign stock,
high concentration of blacks, etc. Additional investigation reveals the absence
of those factors indicative of support for the Republican, Agnew, i.e., high
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concentration of urbanization, higher level of education, higher rate of white
collar occupations, etc. So that electoral preference in this region is easily
accounted for.
It is noteworthy that of the five counties classified as "Upper Eastern
Shore Maryland," Talbot County voted for Agnew by 51% compared to 46% for
Mahoney. This particular county is distinguished by a higher median educa-
tional level (10.5 yrs. compared to 10 yrs. for the region) and is 29% urban
(contrasted to an urbanization rate of 14% for this area in general)
,
and voted
49% for Wallace compared to 53% for the region. So that when compared to
other counties in the region, Talbot County assumes characteristics common
to areas supportive of the Republican; yet when contrasted with the state,
distinguishing traits of the Agnew vote disappear.
ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES (Lower Eastern Shore Maryland)
Investigation of Lower Eastern Shore Maryland (Dorchester, Somerset,
Wicomico, and Worcester Counties) indicates that the region voted for Mahoney
by 53% and Agnew by 45%. This region is distinguished by a high concentra-
tion of the Wallace vote (68%)
,
a low percent of white collar occupations
(32% versus 43% for the state) , a high concentration of black population
(31% compared to 18% for the state) , a low percentage of foreign stock (3%
contrasted to 6% fo r the state) , and a low median educational level (9.6 yrs.
compared to 11 yrs. statewide) . These regional characteristics correspond
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exactly to those cited earlier in our statewide analysis indicating a preference
for the Democrat, Mahoney. Simultaneously, those characteristics common
to areas demonstrating support for the Agnew candidacy are absent in this
region. (See statewide SES factors common to those regions voting
Republican
.
)
Noteworthy, is that a single county (Wicomico) voted 53% for Agnew and
44% for Mahoney. This particular county is featured by a lower percent black
population (25% compared to 31% for the region)
,
a higher median income
level ($8700 compared to $7400 for the region)
,
a higher median educational
level (10.8 compared to 9.6 for the area)
,
a higher percentage of white
collar workers (36% compared to 32% for the region)
,
and a lower concentra-
tion of the Wallace vote (62% compared to 68% for the area) . Relative to region,
then, SES characteristics of Wicomico County suggest a candidate preference
for Agnew. Relative to the state, such factors indicate a preference for
Mahoney. In short, if an attempt is made to study electoral behavior in
Wicomico County (and the aforementioned case of Talbot County) , then such
an evaluation of political behavior is best approached relative to these
counties' respective regions (i.e.
,
Upper and Lower Eastern Shore Mary-
land) as opposed to the state as a whole.
A summary of findings, both statewide and by region, indicate the
following characteristics of the Agnew and Mahoney support.
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THE ENTIRE STATE (Agnew 50%, Mahoney 40%) ^
(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the Agnew Candidacy)
a) higher median educational level
b) lower concentration of the Wallace vote
c) high concentration of foreign stock *
d) high percent urban
e) lower percent blue collar
(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the Mahoney Candidacy)
a) high concentration of the Wallace vote
b) low percent white collar occupations
c) high percent black population
d) low concentration of foreign stock
e) lower median educational level
WESTERN MARYLAND (Agnew 52%, Mahoney 37)
(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the Agnew Candidacy )
a) lower concentration of the Wallace vote
b) lower concentration of black population
c) other factors indicating support for the Republican are not present
PIEDMONT MARYLAND (Agnew 50%, Mahoney 43%)
(Characteristics Ind ic ative of Support for the Agnew Candidacy )
a) lower concentration of the W:allace vote
b) lower percent black population
c) other factors indicating support for the Republican are not present
BALTIMORE METROPOLITAN AREA (Mahoney 45%, Agnew 42%)
(Characteristics Indicative of Support fo r th e Manoney Candidacy )
a) high concentration of the Wallace vote (exclusive of Baltimore City)
b) high percentage black population
c) other factors indicating support for the Democrat are not present
SOUTHERN MARYLAND (Mahoney 57%, Agnew 41%)
(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the Mahoney Candidacy)
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a) high concentration of the Wallace vote
b) high concentration of black population
c) low percent foreign stock
d) other characteristics indicating support for the Democrat are not present
WASHINGTON, D.C. SUBURBAN AREA (Agnew 63%, Mahoney 33%)
(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the Agnew Cand idacy
)
a) higher median educational level
b) lower concentration of the Wallace vote
c) high concentration of foreign stock
d) high concentration of urbanization
e) lower percent blue collar
UPPER EASTERN SHORE MARYLAND (Mahoney 51%, Agnew 45)
(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the Mahoney Candidacy)
a) high concentration of the Wallace vote
b) low percent white collar occupations
c) high percent black population
d) low concentration of foreign stock
e) lower median educational level
LOWER EASTERN SHORE MARYLAND (Mahoney 53%, Agnew 45)
(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the Mahoney Candidacy )
a) high concentration of the Wallace vote
b) low percent white collar occupations
c) high concentration black population
d) low concentration of foreign stock
e) lower median educational level
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Where the Mahoney vote is concerned, we make the following conclu-
sions based upon our analysis. "Percent vote for Wallace" and "percent
black" population appear as the most significant variables in a regional
analysis of candidate preference. Only these variables remain constant
throughout treatment of each particular area, as indicators of such electoral
behavior. For example, a key indicator of support for the Democratic can-
didate (illustrated by our analysis of the entire state)
,
is a lower median
educational level. This characteristic was common to the Upper and Lower
Eastern Shore regions, respectively (and these areas indeed voted Democratic).
However, this distinguishing trait was not common with the Baltimore Metro-
politan Area, where the median educational level was greater than that for the
state as a whole, or Southern Maryland, where educational level was constant
with the state, (yet both regions demonstrated a support for Mahoney) . In
addition, a low concentration of foreign stock is common to but three of four
"Mahoney regions." In sum, only percent vote for Wallace and percent black
remain as universal indicators of candidate preference where the Mahoney
vote is concerned
.
Where the Agnew vote is analyzed, the more significant variables,
again, are percent vote for Wallace and percent black population. Note that
percent black was not one of the five "key" variables cited in our statewide
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survey of characteristics common to the Agnew vote. This variable accounted
for an R Square Change of only .00119. Yet only this variable, in addition
to percent vote for Wallace, remain as constant identifiers of the Agnew
support.
Piedmont Maryland, for example, preferred Agnew yet this region is
characterized by a lower rate of urbanization and constant rates of blue collar
occupations, median education, and foreign stock (relative to the state) .
Investigation of statewide data reveals that a low concentration of urbaniza-
tion is a factor typical of support for Mahoney. So that, as was the case
concerning the support for Mahoney, only percent black and percent vote
for Wallace universally account for voting preference in consideration of the
Agnew candidacy.
The significance of these two particular variables (not treating other
variables with disregard)
,
has implications for the issue of open occupancy
in the election. In assuming a positive association between the 1964 Wallace
vote and a preference for "segregationist policy" on domestically-oriented
civil rights issues, along with the positive relationship between percent
black and favorable white voter reaction to the Mahoney candidacy, OPEN
HOUSING APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A SALIENT ISSUE IN THE 1966 GUBER-
NATORIAL ELECTION . Reference to the initial discussion of candidate
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strategies in the election (in particular, the Mahoney single-issue oriented
campaign)
,
in addition to respective organizational support, appear to
advance the validity of this assertion. Thus a key factor in the determination
of candidate preference was the perception of the Democrat Mahoney as an
anti-open occupancy candidate and the Republican Agnew as a moderate-to-
pro-open housing policy alternative.
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MARYLAND COUNTIES BY "ECONOMIC AREA"
%WALL %BK MINC MEDU %BC %FS %UR %RU %WC %MA %AG
Western Maryland
Allegany
Garrett 10 * 7029
Maryland Piedmont
Carroll
Frederick
Harford
Howard
Washington 32 5 10554
Southern Maryland
Calvert
Charles
St. Mary's 53 29 9128
Upper Eastern Shore
Caroline
Cecil
Kent
Queen Anne's
Talbot 53 21 8078
Lower Eastern Shore
Dorchester
Somerset
Wicomico
Worcester 68 31 7441
Baltimore Metropolitan
Baltimore County
Baltimore City
Anne Arundel 42 22 10791
Washington, D.C. Suburban
Montgomery
Prince Georges 29 13 14580
KEY.
.
designates less than 1%
%Wall . .percent vote for Wallace
%BK. . . .percent black population
MINC . . .median income
MEDU. .median educational level
%BC. .
.
percent blue collar
10.4 63 * 26 73 36 37 52
11.0 55 6 34 66 45 43 50
11.0 52 5 12 88 48 57 41
10.0 66 3 14 75 34 51 45
9.6 67 3 24 75 32 53 45
11.0 47 11 85 14 52 45 42
14.0 28 17 SI 9 72 33 63
%FS.
.
.percent foreign stock
%UR.
.
percent urban
%RU.
.
percent rural
%WC .
.
percent white collar
%MA. .percent vote for Mahoney
%AG.
.
percent vote for Agnew
CHAPTER V
THE ISSUE STATUS OF OPEN OCCUPANCY
Chapter Five proposes to determine the "issue status" of open occupancy
in the 1966 election. Simultaneously, from a theoretical perspective, the
role of this issue in the determination of electoral behavior is examined.
In addressing the above questions, we concern ourselves with criticism
of a central thesis presented in The People's Choice
.
* The key concept in
this presentation is the "Index to Political Predisposition," i.e.
,
evaluation of
voters' SES levels, occupation, religion, and residence, in order to determine
political party preference. Inherent is the belief that electoral preference is
totally the result of party identification. Issues merely account for secondary
political affect as they reinforce party partisanship
.
Authors Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, in support of the Index to
Political Predisposition concept, address the effects of "activation," "rein-
9
forcement," and "conversion" relative to voting behavior. The former term
implies that (a) campaign propaganda arouses interest (b) increased interest
accounts for increased exposure, i.e.
,
voters become more informed; a
cyclical relationship exists here (c) attention is selective in that as interest
increases and the voter becomes aware of the campaign, political predisposi-
tions become significant; out of the wide array of campaign propaganda, due
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to predisposition, the voter will select available information favorable to his
party and reject that which is unfavorable (d) votes crystallize; electoral
preference is based upon the voter's political predisposition.
The reinforcement effect refers to the suggestion that the more inter-
ested people are in the election, the more they tend to expose themselves to
propaganda of their own party. The conversion effect suggests that few
voters are converted to the other party via campaign propaganda, i.e.
,
as
previously implied, voters' behavior is based upon the Index to Political
Predisposition
.
Chief criticism of The People's Choice originates with the study's thesis
which fails to recognize the possibility of a significant party cross-over
phenomenon. Where the activation effect is concerned, to state that "attention
is selective," and that such selection similar to electoral preference, is based
upon Political Predisposition, is to theoretically dismiss the affect of a salient
issue, e.g., open occupancy.
Investigation of the 1966 gubernatorial election indicates electoral
victory for the Republican, Agnew, in a state with a 3 to 1 registered Demo-
cratic majority. Berelson, et. al., associate Republican party identification
with areas of high white collar concentration, high rural concentration, and
Protestant affiliation (this latter factor will not be addressed due to unreadi-
ness of figures) . In the 1966 Maryland election, quantitative analysis of the
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Agnew and Mahoney votes, at initial inspection, support findings of The
People's Choice
. In other words, the Republican vote was distinguished by
higher median income, higher median education, and white collar concentra-
tion, while the Democratic vote was characterized by lower SES level - blue
collar areas. However, the Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area,
containing the state's two most wealthy counties, and highly white collar in
occupation, while voting for the Republican in 1966, is registered Democratic
by a 2 to 1 margin. Furthermore, the authors attribute a significant urban
concentration as an indicator of support for the Democratic party. This
variable appears unreliable in predicting the 1966 vote given support regis-
tered for the Agnew and Mahoney candidacies in the Washington, D.C. and
Baltimore Metropolitan areas respectively. Investigation of the black vote,
traditionally Democratic since the New Deal, indicates that 70% of this group
earning less than $3000 a year voted Republican. The purpose of these
observations is to demonstrate the validity of our assertion that electoral
preference in the 1966 gubernatorial race, at least within given areas of the
state, was possibly based upon reaction to the salient open occupancy issue.
Such preference cannot totally be accounted for by political predisposition in
this case. The Democrat, Mahoney, represented the position opposed to
enforced open occupancy while the Republican, Agnew, represented a more
moderate stand (as many perceived it) . The activation effect, then, did not
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universally determine voter preference. The Democratic party was
attractive to voters opposed to open occupancy while the Republican party
was the alternative presented to advocates or moderates on the issue. Voter
preference was based upon this dichotomy.
Quantitative analysis of the 1966 election demonstrated, for example,
an attraction for the Democrat in areas of high black concentration where a
white majority existed. Such support appears to transgress degree of urban
or rural concentration as indicators of the 1966 vote relative to the accuracy
that knowledge of percent black population permits. We imply a definite
relationship between high percent black, vote for Mahoney, and the saliency
of open occupancy. The political affect of the integrated housing issue can-
not be accounted for given the theoretical base of The People's Choice ,
where selection of candidates and exposure to campaign propaganda is solely
dependent upon Political Predisposition.
It was aforementioned that the reinforcement effect incorporated the
thesis that the more interested people are in the election, the more they tend
to expose themselves to propaganda of their own party. The Baltimore Sun
indicated that an above average 700 to 800 thousand Marylanders were
expected to participate in an election where "open occupancy" had ". . .divided
voters." (This voting figure represented 57% of the state's eligible voters
compared to the 44% that participated in the 1962 governor's race) .
4 Given
139
a brief county analysis, it is discovered that nine traditionally Democratic
counties voted Republican in 1966. Note that where these nine "defecting"
counties were concerned, the mean rate of voter turnout was an incredible
65% compared to the already unusually high 57% state figure. This appears
to indicate the invalid nature of the reinforcement effect (i.e.
,
the greater the
interest in an election, the greater party reinforcement)
,
where this guber-
natorial election is concerned, and simultaneously explains at least a single,
major reason for the Republican victory in the election. Acceptance of the
reinforcement effect does not permit an accurate evaluation of significant
party defection in a high-turnout election; (this description, we claim,
correctly evaluates the governor's race in 1966) . Below, are listed the nine
counties which crossed-over to the GOP. Both the high-turnout and defection
phenomenons are demonstrated.
COUNTY %REGISTERED (D) %VOTE (D) %VOTE (R) %VOTER
TURNOUT*
Carroll 55
Frederick 59
Harford 74
Montgomery 65
Prince Georges 73
Talbot 64
Washington 59
Wicomico 70
Baltimore City 83
42 47 67
41 52 65
42 47 70
25 71 70
41 54 64
46 51 65
40 56 65
44 53 63
37 47 59
* compared to state mean of 57%
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Close inspection indicates that where these particular Democratic counties are
concerned
,
Mahoney received an average of 39% of the vote compared to an
average of 53% for Agnew, the Republican; this despite the fact that these
counties average 67% registered Democratic!
Another problem exists in acceptance of the Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and
Gaudet study, relative to the Maryland Gubernatorial Election. The reinforce-
ment effect claims the greater one's interest in the election, the greater the
support demonstrated for one's own party. Yet, as previously stated, the
Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area, registered majority Democratic,
voted Republican. Given this support demonstrated for the opposition party,
conventional wisdom suggests that interest in this particular region would be
significantly high due to the superior rates of median education and income.
If such wisdom is accepted, we have a case where party cross-over, not
reinforcement, occurred in an area demonstrating high interest in the
election--a definite challenge to the universal acceptability of the thesis
presented in The People's Choice .
Our point, again, is that the activation and reinforcement effects, as
a concept of Political Predisposition, are not universally accurate in their
evaluation of electoral behavior. In other words, attitudes on open occupancy
determined electoral preference for a significant number of voters. Simple
party identification did not totally account for such actions. The party
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defection from the Democrats supports this assertion
. Note that it is important
to realize that we do not claim The People’s Choice to be invalid in evaluating
voter behavior in given elections, but only where the Maryland governor's
race in 1966 is concerned (due to the saliency of open occupancy)
. Indeed,
Political Predisposition accounted for some affect in this Maryland election
also.
The validity of the conversion effect, as universally accurate in ex-
plaining voter behavior, given previous analysis, can be quickly dismissed.
Key to the conversion effect thesis is that few voters are converted by
campaign propaganda. This was proven not to be the case in the Maryland
election as a significant party cross-over was demonstrated. A major assump-
tion on our part is that open occupancy was given to campaign propaganda;
(previous discussion of the campaigns in both the primary and general
election would seem to support our stated assumption) . In conclusion, with
respect to The People's Choice
,
electoral behavior was largely based upon
reaction to the open occupancy issue and not solely upon Political Predisposi-
tion . The phenomenons and occurrences cited with respect to the gubernator-
ial election appear to indicate this .
In consideration of the significant role assigned to open occupancy we
also address the thesis presented in Voting , where only "position" issues can
account for political cleavage and partisan behavior as opposed to "style"
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issues that result in general consensus or non-partisan dispute. 5 Position
issues are distinguished by matters of money and material power, i.e.
,
economic interests. Such issues have a long range time duration, result in
tangible gains for the successful group in the conflict, and usually cannot be
made salient by simple party propaganda. Policy on taxation is an example
of a position issue. Style issues are characterized by matters of style, taste,
way of life and general cultural and personal interests. This type issue
involves questions of short range time duration, opposition between various
racial and ethnic groups, and symbolic gratifications for successful groups
in the conflict. By the above description then, open occupancy appears to be
classified as a style issue. In fact, very generally, authors Berelson,
Lazarsfeld, and McPhee assign style issue status to all civil rights questions.
With the classification of open occupancy as a style issue we have no argument.
However, we maintain that this issue definitely accounted for significant
cleavage and partisan dispute in the 1966 Maryland Gubernatorial Election.
Acceptance of the Voting thesis denies the validity of this assertion . Yet
previous inspection of the Democratic primary indicated sharp disagreement
among the party's candidates over the open housing issue. So significant
was the difference of opinion that ultimately, numerous Democrats throughout
the state refused to support the party's nominee, George Mahoney, in the
general election . Such lack of support for the Mahoney candidacy permitted
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a Republican victory
,
only possible via significant defection from the
Democratic party. This phenomenon, we argue, demonstrates the existence
of political cleavage (via defection within the Democratic party)
,
and partisan
dispute (via the perception by some traditional Democrats that the Republican
party offered the more desirable policy stance on open occupancy)
.
In the 1966 election, voters perceived two distinct positions on the
open occupancy question. The Democrat, Mahoney, was perceived as
unequivocally opposed to enforced open occupancy and where some voters
were concerned, the candidate was an attractive choice due to his segrega-
tionist-oriented position. This we assume given the quantitative analysis
which indicated a positive relationship between the Mahoney vote and the
1964 vote for the Wallace candidacy.
The Republican, Agnew, was perceived as an advocate of "moderate
integration" (advocating open housing where new developments were con-
cerned)
,
but most significantly the candidate was perceived by some voters
as a genuine alternative to a segregationist policy on the issue. This conclu-
sion appears valid in consideration of the significant amount of black vote
compiled by Agnew. Certainly, if the thesis associated with V.O. Key Jr.'s
The Responsible Electorate is accepted , then voters rationally decided
candidate (or party) preference based upon a perceived alternative presented
on the open occupancy question. Note that Key views voters' actions as
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"predictable and automatic responses to campaign stimuli" (i.e., voters are
swayed by campaign propaganda initiated by the candidates)
. Yet more
importantly, in explaining voter behavior, the perceptions of the behavior
of the electorate held by political leaders, agitators, and activists, condition
the types of appeals politicians employ as they seek popular support.
Given Key's "echo chamber" thesis, such perceptions by politicians affect
the nature of INPUT (public policies advocated by a party) and thereby
controls OUTPUT (the citizen's vote)
. The people's verdict is no more
selective than those alternatives presented by political officials.
Where the Maryland Gubernatorial Election of 1S66 is concerned,
Mahoney perceived most voters as opposed to open occupancy and popular
support dependent upon the appropriate housing position. Likewise, Agnew
perceived voters in favor (or at least tolerant) of open occupancy, and
thus, popular sanction of his candidacy necessitated a pro-to-moderate
housing policy. In both cases, the voter responded to the alternatives
presented to him
.
Most significantly, the argument is advanced that "voters are not
fools." The electorate behaves as rationally and responsibly as can be ex-
pected, given the clarity of alternatives presented. So that faced with a
choice on open housing in the Maryland Election, voters' decisions were
primarily based upon policy preference vis-a-vis this civil rights question,
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(indeed, input into the echo chamber did not permit significant voter
behavior to be based upon any alternative issue)
.
As voter preference is determined by limited alternatives (initiated
by politicians)
,
such citizen behavior is likewise the result of government
action and inaction. Key suggests that government activity (inactivity)
,
is
what determines prolonged support, opposition, or converts proponents into
opponents or vice-versa. Whether the "switcher" (those who change party
preference within two successive elections)
,
or the "standpatter" (those
who vote the same party in two successive elections) is of concern, the voter
is moved in a manner that is sensible in the light of his policy wishes. Thus,
many of those who voted for Mr. Mahoney (whether Democrats or Republicans),
were opposed to open occupancy while those indicating a preference for
Agnew, were at least tolerant on this question. (While it is implied that
standpatters remain with the party (e.g. Democrats voting for Mahoney)
because they adhere to party policy on an issue, Key states that some voters
that tend to disagree with party stance do not switch.) In essence, the voter
is concerned with what government has or has not done and what it proposes
to do . With respect to the Maryland Gubernatorial Election, we suspect that
voters, presented with the candidacies of Spiro Agnew and George Mahoney,
were mostly concerned about what government, proposed to do in relation
to the prospects of open occupancy. In sum:
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a) voters are rational and, accordingly, base electoral decision upon their
preference of public policy
b) the alternatives presented on public policy in addition to the issue on
which choices are offered to the voter, are determined by candidates'
perceptions of political positions that possess popular appeal. (We addressed
this last point in Chapter Three, where it was suggested that Mr. Mahoney's
campaign strategy capitalized on the open occupancy issue)
.
So that given the Key analysis of voter behavior, a policy alternative
on integrated housing, and the significant party cross-over by voters, a
strong case is made for the existence of political cleavage and partisan
behavior over a style issue in this particular election.
Berelson, et al.
,
additionally comment that "when style issues come
into conflict, it is only a question of deciding which candidate would realize
7
a certain goal faster . " Acceptance of the V.O. Key, Jr. study, i.e., the
existence of voter rationality, would appear to indicate that voters perceived
some disparity on open occupancy position between the two parties. Very
simply, it is suggested that the Mahoney and Agnew candidacies advocated
different "ends" to the open housing question, not different "means" to
achieve an identical end, as Voting would imply. If the Voting thesis is
accepted, where this particular election is concerned, a belief is necessitated
that the goal of achieving immediate integration (where new developments are
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concerned)
,
is similar to opposition to enforced open occupancy. We maintain
that the above goals, representative of the Agnew and Mahoney candidacies
respectively, were not similar in nature Furthermore, such similarity was
not perceived by voters as indicated by their electoral behavior.
In sum, while we agree that open occupancy is indeed a style issue by
definition--as Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee indicate, we disagree with
the assumed universal declaration that style issues cannot result in political
cleavage, partisan behavior, and concern only a choice of alternative means
to reach identical goals. The 1966 Maryland Gubernatorial Election, given
the saliency of open occupancy, lends validity to our assertion.
It was initially suggested that the purpose of this chapter was to
determine the "issue status" of open occupancy in the 1966 election. We
additionally claimed this issue to be instrumental in accounting for voter
behavior and validated the assertion, in part, by addressing shortcomings in
The People's Choice and Voting . Evaluation of the role of issues relative
to electoral behavior, as presented in The American Voter , lends partial
o
support to our hypothesis .
9
Admittedly
,
the key thesis of The American Voter is that party
identification has a profound impact on behavior through its influence on
voter attitudes. The intensity of attitude forces upon the individual are said
to determine degree of partisanship. It is further suggested that due to the
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complexities of politics and government, which prohibit matters from being
common knowledge to voters
,
party affiliation supplies the individual with
"cues" by which politics are evaluated. (We have claimed that the Mahoney
candidacy was judged on the open occupancy issue, and not according to
simple party affiliation; analysis of the party cross-over phenomenon in
rejection of The People's Choice thesis addressed this matter in detail. It
should be also noted, that while Mr. Mahoney lost the election, the remaining
Democratic ticket was victorious
.
Given the primary status of party identification, as that which deter-
mines voter behavior, Campbell et al. suggest that candidate personality is
secondary where electoral decision is concerned. The political role of the
candidate is described as that which is unclear as to whether certain conditions
occasion the emergence of a particular individual, or the politician hastens
the arrival of particular events. In any case, the candidate is viewed as the
representative of his party and is judged by that label. (With respect to the
political role of the candidate's personality and the Mahoney position on open
occupancy, it appears as though certain conditions did occasion the emergence
of the Democrat's candidacy as opposed to the alternative theory offered
.
(It was stated in Chapter Three that the key to Mahoney's campaign strategy
was a perception of popular support based upon a position taken on the
potentially salient open occupancy issue) .
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^ s The American Voter assigns primary and secondary importance to
the affect of party identification and candidate personality in the determination
of voter preference, the role of "issues" is relegated to tertiary status. The
authors state that most voters lack "familiarity" with issues, i.e.
,
the
electorate is not aware of a particular problem or is unable (doesn't care to)
express an opinion on a matter. In this case, voters acquaint themselves
with issues via information "screened" by the political party. In essence,
partisan identification determines electoral preference. (Note the reinforce-
ment effect concept associated with The People's Choice) .
Yet unlike the presentations of The People's Choice and Voting,
The American Voter does not dismiss the possibility of a phenomenon where
a salient issue such as open occupancy can account for electoral behavior.
This is our chief source of support emanating from this study. The authors
suggest that several criteria must be met if an issue is to bear upon a
person's vote decision. Emphasized is the fact that such criteria do not
assure that an issue affects electoral behavior, but the possibility of such a
phenomenon does not exist without the issue conforming to these minimal
requirements. In order for an issue to affect the individual's voting decision,
the following conditions must exist:
a) the issue must be cognized in some form
b) the issue must arouse some minimal intensity of feeling
c) there must be some perception by voters, that one party represents the
person's own position on the issue better than the other party
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Investigation of the 1966 gubernatorial election suggests that open occupancy
could have theoretically determined voter preference, as the issue conforms
to the above requirements. We submit that voters were aware of the existence
of the open housing issue and demonstrated definite opinions on it, as to
cognize an issue dictates. Certainly the Mahoney candidacy itself, given the
single-issue orientation of the Democrat's campaign, assisted in making open
occupancy a familiar issue. Indeed, the perceived necessity of other
candidates to unwillingly re-orient their campaign platforms in order to
incorporate an open housing position, given the affect of the Mahoney
strategy, indicates voter awareness on this issue--at least as perceived by
the candidates . The authors claim that definite opinions will be expressed
by voters when a state of affairs, associated with an issue, is evaluated as
"good or bad," "desirable or undesirable."^ Open occupancy was
perceived in this manner by voters. Analysis in Chapter One, of "reasons"
why individuals preferred segregation in housing supports our claim; e.g.,
certain groups were considered undesirable neighbors due to perceived
losses in property value, increased taxes due to necessity for increased
social services, etc. Likewise, other groups indicated the desirability for
open occupancy as a means to improve the possibilities of better housing
,
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The existence of integrated housing, then, was perceived as "good and bad,"
"desirable and undesirable" by various groups.
Reference to previous analysis which indicated an above average
voter turnout in the 1966 election compared to the 1962 gubernatorial race
demonstrates, at least, a minimal intensity of feeling. Hiah voter turnout
rates were discovered to exist within the entire state, and particularly
within those traditional Democratic counties that defected to the GOP. Most
significant in evaluating the voter's potential intensity of feeling is a recog-
nition that the absolute importance of goals (or values) is not as important
as the individual's perception of goals that will be realized and goals that
will be hindered under alternative policies.^ Given the support registered
for the Mahoney candidacy, these individuals perceived the potential election
of Republican Spiro Agnew as synonymous with enforced open occupancy
where such legislation was opposed. Where support for the Agnew candidacy
existed
,
among blacks for example
,
the Mahoney opposition to open occupan-
cy was perceived as a thwart to the goal of integrated housing . This
dichotomy, we maintain, accurately reflects the perceptions of a significant
number of Maryland voters in this election. Issues such as tax reform,
increased aid to education (and other issues which, in previous chapters,
have been referred to as "secondary") , appeared not to have significantly
produced an intensity of feeling among voters, in that values or goals
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concerning these issues were not perceived as thwarted under alternative
policies offered by the candidates. (See discussion of "secondary issues"
in the campaign, Chapters Three and Four, where position similarity is
stressed
.
)
Analysis of the 1966 gubernatorial election also demonstrates that
voters did perceive one party to better represent their position on the issue
of open occupancy, relative to the other party. It was previously stated
that the significant defection from the Democratic party (most evident among
nine traditionally Democratic counties)
,
enabled the Republican, Agnew, to
win the election in a state where registered Democrats outnumber Republi-
cans, 3 to 1 . For these voters who defected, the Republican party repre-
sented a policy stand on open occupancy more similar to their own, while
the Mahoney candidacy was perceived as a hinder to the pursuit of estab-
lished values or goals concerning the issue; again, this, we maintain was
true for a significant number of voters who crossed party lines. Open
occupancy indeed appears to have been the key issue upon which party
defection was based as other issues in the campaign theoretically fail to
conform to the requirements that necessitate at least a minimal intensity
of feeling among voters. In other words, secondary campaign issues, we
claim, could not have significantly accounted for party defection.
Where Democratic party identifiers did not cross-over, we suggest
that a policy choice on open occupancy was similarly perceived and that
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voters preferred the Mahoney position; again, our claims as to voter per-
ceptions and behavior with respect to this election, are not universal in
application. Democratic voters, then, correctly perceived that the Demo-
cratic party represented their own stand on open housing better than the
opposition party . The concept of voter choice on policy alternatives is
key here, in that electoral behavior was based on the correct evaluation of
the Mahoney candidacy and not simple Political Predisposition. Quantita-
tive analysis demonstrated a positive association between the Mahoney
vote and the Wallace vote which implies a natural attraction for the former
candidate's open occupancy position given acceptance of the Alabama
governor's segregationist platform in 1964. Other regions traditionally
Democratic that declined to support Wallace, also did not support Mahoney
two years later. In addition, those economic areas that voted for Mahoney
in the general election also cast support for the candidate in the primary.
Surely, electoral preference for Mahoney in the Democratic primary indicates
a preference for an anti-open housing position given the single-issue
orientation of the candidate and our previous analysis. Those Democrats
that did not support Mahoney in the primary, for the most part, voted
Republican. So that where open occupancy was concerned, voters perceived
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that one party represented the person's own position on the issue better
than the opposition party.
In conclusion, analysis of The American Voter thesis indicates that
FOR AN EXTENSIVE NUMBER OF VOTERS, open occupancy could have
determined electoral preference in the 1966 gubernatorial election. Note
that the possible significance of party identification is net discounted
,
though we claim for it a secondary role. Our assertion appears additionally
valid, given the support of the Key study and the shortcomings of The
People's Choice and Voting theses.
CONCLUSION
Very simply, our thesis implies that the salient open occupancy issue
accounted for a significant degree of electoral preference in the 1966 Maryland
Gubernatorial Election. This conclusion has been validated by methods
which served as the body of our chapter presentations.
1) Definite attitudes on integrated housing were found to exist among voters,
and such attitudes were represented by politicians.
2) Verbal and quantitative analysis of candidates' campaigns and voter
support with respect to the primary and general election demonstrated the
significance of open occupancy in determining electoral preference.
3) Open housing was discovered as a possible determinant of electoral
preference given the issue's compliance with minimum theoretical require-
ments established by The American Voter .
Note that the possible affect of party identification upon voters' choice
is not denied in this election, yet we believe, given an aggregate evaluation
of this thesis presentation, that the salient open occupancy issue significantly
explains much of the variance in the 1966 governor's vote.
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